2018

Imputing Regulatory Failures in Oil and Gas Licensing: A
Discussion and Proposal
Joseph A. Schremmer
University of New Mexico - School of Law

Charles C. Steincamp
Depew Gillen Rathbun and McInteer

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/law_facultyscholarship
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, and the Oil, Gas, and
Mineral Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Joseph A. Schremmer & Charles C. Steincamp, Imputing Regulatory Failures in Oil and Gas Licensing: A
Discussion and Proposal, 57 Washburn Law Journal 265 (2018).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/law_facultyscholarship/719

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the UNM School of Law at UNM Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu,
lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

Imputing Regulatory Failures in Oil and Gas
Licensing: A Discussion and Proposal
Joseph A. Schremmer
Charles C. Steincamp
I. INTRODUCTION
Abandoned unplugged wells are a growing problem in Kansas, as
elsewhere. Unplugged wells are known to pose pollution risks to useable
surface water and groundwater. While the state has a fulsome statutory
and regulatory scheme requiring inactive wells to be plugged upon
abandonment, large numbers of wells have been orphaned by their
responsible operators.
In recent years the Kansas Corporation
Commission (³Commission´), which regulates oil and gas activity in the
state, discovered a useful tool in ensuring plugging of abandoned wells:
the authority to license oil and gas operators under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55155. Under this statute, the Commission¶s staff has denied new and
renewed operator licenses on the basis of applicants¶ association, through
common owners, officers, directors, and familial connections, with other
licensed and formerly licensed operators that are noncompliant with
Commission regulations. In many, and perhaps most cases, the underlying
regulatory noncompliance pertains to the failure to plug abandoned oil,
gas, or injection wells. It appears this practice is intended to address the
significant and growing problem of unplugged wells that are no longer
within the responsibility of any active licensed operator.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155(c)(4) requires license applicants to
demonstrate compliance with all requirements of Chapter 55 of the Kansas
Statutes Annotated (pertaining to oil and gas development) and
Commission regulations. The provision requires compliance not only by
the applicant, but also by ³(B) any officer, director, partner or member of
the applicant; (C) any stockholder owning in the aggregate more than 5%
 Partner, Depew Gillen Rathbun & McInteer, L.C., Wichita, Kansas; Adjunct Professor of Law,
University of Kansas School of Law; Adjunct Professor, Washburn University School of Law.
 Managing Partner, Depew Gillen Rathbun & McInteer, L.C., Wichita, Kansas, Professional
Geologist #351.

265

266

Washburn Law Journal

[Vol. 57

of the stock of the applicant; and (D) any spouse, parent, brother, sister,
child, parent-in-law, brother-in-law or sister-in-law of the foregoing.´1
Thus, if the Commission determines that the applicant or any of these
identified individuals is out of compliance with the Commission¶s
authorizing statutes or its rules, regulators, or orders, it may deny the
application for a new or renewal license.
In determining the regulatory compliance of an associated individual
identified in subsection (c)(4), the Commission, acting through its legal
and technical staff, considers not only the record of the individual
personally, but also the records of any other licensed operators with whom
the individual has been associated. As an illustration, the Commission
would deny an application for renewal of Acme Oil Co.¶s operator license
if it were to find that its president, James Acme, was formerly a director of
Ibid Petroleum, LLC, which operates an inactive well that is subject to the
Commission¶s order to plug. In this example, the Commission first
determined that James Acme was responsible for Ibid Petroleum, LLC¶s
unplugged well. Then, pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155(c)(4), it
imputed James Acme¶s derivative responsibility for the well to Acme Oil
Co. The Commission¶s action disregarded the two entities¶ legal
separateness and limited liability. There was no showing that James Acme
was personally responsible for the inactive unplugged well, yet the
Commission held Acme Oil Co. responsible for the well via James
Acme¶s connection with Ibid Petroleum, LLC. The Commission would
then give Acme Oil Co. a choice: either take responsibility for Ibid
Petroleum, LLC¶s unplugged well or lose its license. Cases like this
hypothetical are increasingly common. The Commission has denied
license renewal applications based on applicant¶s associations with
separate noncompliant operators through common directors, owners, and
family members.2
1. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-155(c)(4) (2015).
2. See, e.g., Summer Sun Gas, Inc., Docket No. 18-CONS-3062-CMSC, 2017 Kan. PUC
LEXIS 1659, at *1±2 (Kan. Corp. Comm¶n Aug. 1. 2017) (denying application for renewal of operator
license, stating, ³Upon review of the application, Staff determined the application does not meet the
requirements of K.S.A. 55-155 and K.A.R. 82-3-120. Specifically, the application does not satisfy
K.S.A. 55-155(c)(4) as available records demonstrate Operator is associated with Kelly Oil Company,
License No. 5632 (µAssociated Entity¶) which is an operator out of compliance with K.S.A. Chapter
55. Specifically, Conservation Division records identify [John Doe] as a partner of Operator and as a
partner of Associated Entity. Associated Entity is not in compliance with all requirements of K.S.A.
Chapter 55 as Associated Entity is suspended per the Commission¶s Order in 16-CONS-3816-CSHO.
Under K.S.A. 55-155(c)(4), no application or renewal shall be approved until the applicant has
demonstrated to the Commission¶s satisfaction that the applicant complies with all requirements of
K.S.A. Chapter 55.´); Matador, Inc., Docket No. 18-CONS-3060-CMSC, 2017 Kan. PUC LEXIS
1650, at *1±2 (Kan. Corp. Comm¶n Aug. 1, 2017) (denying application for renewal of operator license
on substantially similar grounds, stating that an individual who was a partner in the applicant was also
a partner in another ³Associated Entity´ that had a suspended operator license); Dolphin Energy LLC,
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A recent case, however, has caused the Commission to reconsider its
authority to issue summary denials in this fashion. The Commission¶s
decision in Agricultural Energy Services3 repudiated the Commission
staff¶s interpretation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155(c)(4) as providing
authority to deny an operator license application on the basis of regulatory
violations for which the applicant or its constituents are not personally
directly liable.4
The Commission¶s interpretation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155(c)(4)
following Agricultural Energy Services raises the question: What does it
mean for an applicant¶s constituent to be ³personally liable´ for the
regulatory violations of other operators in relationships that may appear in
the statute? There is no guidance for whether, or under what substantive
and procedural standards, the Commission may impute personal liability
on an applicant¶s constituent for the wrongs of its past associates. As
Commission staff argued in Agricultural Energy Services, the state has a
strong and increasingly urgent interest in ensuring the plugging of
abandoned wells.5 This interest, however, is at odds with the concept of
limited corporate liability, which is ³deeply ingrained in our economic and

Docket No. 17-CONS-3503-CEXC, 2017 Kan. PUC LEXIS 1036, at *1±2 (Kan. Corp. Comm¶n Apr.
13, 2017) (granting an application for renewal of an operator license after initially denying the same
³due to the affiliation of a principal of Applicant with Ramco Energy Corporation, which was found
responsible for an unplugged well . . . in Docket 16-CONS-383-CSHO´); Black Gold Oil, LLC,
Docket No. 18-CONS-3119-CMSC, 2017 Kan. PUC LEXIS 1852, at *1±2 (Kan. Corp. Comm¶n Aug.
29, 2017) (denying application for operator license renewal because a principal of the applicant was
the son of an individual affiliated with an operator that had an unplugged well remaining on its
license); Application of Wayne E. Bright, Docket No. 18-CONS-3059-CMSC, 2017 Kan. PUC LEXIS
1666, at *1±2 (Kan. Corp. Comm¶n Aug. 1, 2017) (denying application for operator license renewal
because a partner of the applicant was ³an authorized signatory´ of another operator that was
suspended under Commission regulations); Heckert Constr. Co., Docket No. 18-CONS-3214-CMSC,
2017 Kan. PUC LEXIS 2265, at *4±5 (Kan. Corp. Comm¶n Nov. 16, 2017) (denying application for
renewal of operator license because ³available records identify an association with JRC Production,
LLC, License # 34255 (µAssociated Entity¶), which is not in compliance with all requirements of
K.S.A. Chapter 55, as Associated Entity has an unplugged well remaining on its expired license and is
suspended´); Application of John Douglas Pitman Rev. Tr., Docket No. 18-CONS-3212-CMSC, 2017
Kan. PUC LEXIS 2267, at *4±5 (Kan. Corp. Comm¶n Nov. 16, 2017) (denying application for
renewal of operator license because trustee of applicant was associated with an entity with an
unplugged well remaining on its license); Application of Ensminger Energy, LLC, Docket No. 18CONS-3121-CMSC, 2017 Kan. PUC LEXIS 1838, at *1±2 (Kan. Corp. Comm¶n Aug. 29, 2017)
(denying application for renewal of operator license because of an association with an entity with a
suspended license); see also, e.g., Nadel & Gussman, LLC, Docket No. 17-CONS-3655-CMSC, 2017
Kan. PUC LEXIS 1332 (Kan. Corp. Comm¶n May 18, 2017) (Setting a prehearing conference on the
Commission¶s notice of denial of a license renewal application. The authors know anecdotally that the
grounds for denial was that the applicant¶s officer was a former director of a licensed operator that was
responsible for an unplugged well in violation of the regulation.).
3. Docket No. 17-CONS-3529-CMSC, 2018 Kan. PUC LEXIS 125 (Kan. Corp. Comm¶n Jan.
23, 2018) (granting in part and denying in part Agricultural Energy Services¶ motion for summary
judgment).
4. Id. at *17±18.
5. Id. at *14±16.
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Courts disregard the separateness of business
legal systems.´6
organizations, by imputing corporate liabilities to shareholders or agents,
only in extraordinary circumstances. Administrative agencies¶ authority
to pierce the corporate veil in adjudicative proceedings is murky at best.
This Article argues that the Commission¶s legitimate interest in
enforcing its oil and gas regulations, especially including well-plugging
regulations, does not justify absolute imputation of regulatory liability to
third-party operators under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155(c)(4). But, under
certain circumstances, the state¶s interest may justify imputing personal
liability on the individual constituents of a license applicant where the
individual is culpable for the underlying regulatory violation or the
applicant has a business connection with the operator primarily
responsible for the violation, and the competing public policies of
groundwater protection and limited liability justify the imputation. This
Article proposes a procedural and substantive standard for the
Commission to follow in adjudicating operator licenses under Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 55-155(c)(4) that balances the need for enforcement with the
individual rights of license applicants and their corporate constituents.
Section II of this Article surveys the state¶s interest in ensuring the
responsible plugging of oil, gas, and water injection (or disposal) wells,
and outlines the existing statutory and regulatory well-plugging scheme.
Section II concludes with a discussion of Agricultural Energy Services.
Section III discusses the legal constraints on the state¶s power to enforce
these statutes and regulations by imputing liability for abandoned wells on
third-party applicants for new and renewal operator licenses. This Section
first outlines the constraints imposed by corporate law and the principle of
limited liability for owners, directors, officers, and other agents of
business organizations. Section III next analyzes the restrictions on the
Commission¶s power imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment¶s procedural
and substantive due process guarantees. Section III concludes with a
relatively brief survey of the administrative law principles governing the
Commission¶s actions in denying license applications under the statute.
Section IV synthesizes the state¶s legitimate interest and the
constraints on its power set forth in the preceding Sections, and proposes
an eight factor test for the Commission to apply in future licensing
proceedings. This test would permit the Commission to deny a license
under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155(c)(4) due to an applicant¶s constituents¶
association with other operators if it finds either some culpability on the
6. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998) (quoting Douglas & Shanks, Insulation
from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 193 (1929)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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part of an individual constituent or a business association between the
applicant and the operator primarily responsible for the underlying
violation. It further calls on the Commission to balance the competing
public policies at stake in these license proceedings by considering the
severity of the underlying violation and its proportionality to the effects on
the applicant of ignoring its corporate form and denying the license. A
balancing test (or a similar factors test) best protects the state¶s strong
interest in preserving the public and environment from the negative
externalities of oil and gas activities, including the pollution hazard posed
by unplugged wells, without sacrificing the deeply ingrained principles of
limited liability and due process.
II. UNPLUGGED WELLS IN KANSAS: THE PROBLEM, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
STATUTORY ENFORCEMENT
A. A Brief History of the Problem
The first oil well in Kansas was drilled in 1860 by a newspaper man
named George W. Brown from Lawrence, Kansas, and his partners.7 The
well did not produce oil or gas in commercial quantities.8 Activity was
slow during the Civil War until, three decades later the Norman #1 well
was drilled near Neodesha, in the eastern part of the state, and produced
commercial quantities of oil from a depth of 832 feet.9 The Norman #1
well is considered by many to be America¶s first significant oil well west
of the Mississippi River.10 By 1904, Kansas was producing 4,000,000
barrels of crude oil per year. In 1915, the El Dorado Field east of Wichita
was launched with the discovery of the Stapleton #1 well drilled by Cities
Services Company in Butler County, Kansas.11 Since that time, more than
430,000 oil and gas wells have been drilled in Kansas.12 Those wells
currently include 69,023 producing oil wells, 24,294 producing gas wells,
6127 producing coalbed methane wells, 5832 saltwater injection wells,
and 7784 enhanced oil recovery wells.13 Through October 2017, the state

7. Lawrence H. Skelton, A Brief History of the Kansas Oil and Gas Industry, 7 OIL-INDUSTRY
HISTORY, no. 1, 2006, at 1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Oil and Gas Well Statistics for Kansas, KANSAS GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (Jan. 16, 2018),
http://www.kgs.ku.edu/PRS/wellStats.html [https://perma.cc/RP3Q-9UPN].
13. Id.
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of Kansas had produced 6,648,889,680 barrels of oil and 40,966,467,801
thousand cubic feet of natural gas.14
Many of the wells drilled in Kansas since 1860 have been plugged
poorly or not at all. As of January 2018, the Commission reported a
statewide inventory of 21,734 abandoned and unplugged wells.15 This
was a net increase of 86 wells over the total for 2017. Since the state
began its Abandoned Well Plugging and Site Remediation Program in
1996,16 the Commission has plugged 10,104 abandoned oil and gas wells,
averaging 505 each year.17 At this pace, it will require approximately 43
more years to plug the known abandoned wells. In 2017 alone, however,
the known unplugged abandoned wells increased by 3001 from the
Commission¶s count at the beginning of 2016.18 Based on the statistics
above, it is likely that far more abandoned, unplugged wells will be
discovered in the state over the next several years. At present, the number
is increasing faster than the wells can be plugged.
B. The State’s Policy Against Unplugged Wells and Scheme of
Enforcement
Kansas law recognizes that unplugged wells can pose a risk to usable
groundwater and surface water, either through pollution or the loss of
usable water from downward drainage into an unplugged well.19
Accordingly, the failure to plug a well at the end of its life is punishable as
Recognizing that plugging techniques have evolved
a felony.20
substantially over time, the Kansas Legislature authorized the Commission
to investigate abandoned wells previously plugged.21 The Commission
may drill out plugged wells to test the integrity of the plugs.22 For wells
drilled after July 1, 1996, the Legislature established a plugging assurance
fund to pay the costs of these investigations.23 The Legislature established
a separate fund to investigate and plug wells drilled before July 1, 1996.24
14. State Production and Historical Information, KANSAS GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (Jan. 24, 2016),
http://www.kgs.ku.edu/PRS/petro/state.html [https://perma.cc/EWR2-H7QW].
15. Abandoned Oil & Gas Well Status Report 2018, KAN. CORP. COMM¶N 3 (Jan. 2018),
http://www.kcc.state.ks.us/images/PDFs/legislative-reports/2018_Abandoned_Wells_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CSG5-658S].
16. See infra text accompanying note 21.
17. Abandoned Oil & Gas Well Status Report 2018, supra note 15, at 3.
18. Abandoned Oil & Gas Well Status Report 2017, KAN. CORP. COMM¶N (Jan. 2018)
http://www.kcc.state.ks.us/images/PDFs/legislativereports/2017_abandoned_oil_gas_well_status_repo
rt.pdf [https://perma.cc/L299-ZSFD].
19. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-156 (1993).
20. Id.
21. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-161 (2001).
22. Id.
23. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-167 (2001).
24. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-192 (1998); KAN. STAT. ANN § 55-193 (2017).
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Together, these funds provide money to plug abandoned wells for which
no responsible operator can be found.
Under Kansas law, inactive, unplugged wells are deemed likely to
cause pollution of usable water strata or supply.25 The legislature also
declared that abandoned oil and gas surface structures are a public
nuisance. Under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-177, following termination of an oil
and gas lease, the lease operator must remove all surface structures and
equipment and re-grade the surface of the soil in a ³manner as to leave the
land, as nearly as practicable, in the same condition . . . as it was before
such structures and abutments were placed thereon.´26 Leaving oil and
gas production structures on the land is punishable as a misdemeanor
offense.27
Ensuring that wells are properly plugged after they cease producing
or become inactive is one of the Commission¶s most important functions.
Accordingly, the statutory act authorizing the Commission contains a
licensing procedure for oil and gas operators that requires, among other
things, the licensee to post significant financial assurance to ensure the
licensee¶s ability to plug wells that it operates.28 The Commission
adopted detailed regulations governing plugging methods and
procedures.29 To ensure wells are plugged properly, the Commission
requires operators to provide a written plugging application to the
Commission when they intend to plug a well.30 When it receives a
plugging application, the Commission provides the operator with specific
instructions for the proper plugging of the well.31 The operator must
notify the appropriate district office of the operator¶s proposed plugging
plan before plugging.32 The actual plugging operations are often observed
on-site by a member of the Commission¶s staff.
The Commission recently made the issue of unplugged wells a high
regulatory priority.33 Indeed, enforcement of Commission regulations has
25. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-179(d) (2001).
26. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-177(a) (1986).
27. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-177(b) (1986).
28. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-155 (2015).
29. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 82-3-114.
30. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-173 (2009).
31. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 82-3-113.
32. Id.
33. See infra text accompanying note 34. There are a number of ways an inactive, unplugged
well may come to the Commission¶s attention. Oil and gas wells must generally be either producing
or plugged. When a well becomes inactive, but the well¶s operator is not prepared to plug it
permanently, the operator may apply for ³temporary abandonment authority.´ This authority permits
the operator to leave the well inactive and unplugged for one year at a time. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 823-111(a). An operator may receive temporary abandonment authority for a particular well for a
maximum of ten years, at which time the operator must place the well back into service or have it
plugged. Id. Injection wells, such as saltwater disposal wells, are also subject to the state¶s plugging
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generally increased in recent years.
From 2001 to 2012, the
Commission¶s administrative docket included an average of
approximately eight show-cause enforcement orders per year.34 Since
2013, however, the average number of show-cause orders has increased to
450 per year.35 Penalty proceedings, which averaged eighty-eight dockets
per year from 2001 to 2012, have also increased to an average of 450 per
year since 2013.36 Much of the increase in enforcement is attributable to
unplugged wells that have been abandoned by operators whose licenses
have expired. Many of these dockets result in no action by the responsible
operator, and the operator¶s unplugged wells are placed on the state¶s list
for plugging. While it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine exactly
how many of the Commission¶s dockets relate to abandoned and
unplugged wells, there is clearly a substantial increase in the dockets
related to this issue.37 In sum, the prevalence of abandoned, unplugged
wells in the state appears to be driving Commission policy in recent years.
C. The Role of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155(c)(4)
Another mechanism by which the Commission enforces its plugging
rules involves Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155, the state¶s oil and gas operator
licensing statute. Subsection (c)(4) of the statute states that an applicant
for a new or renewal operator license must:
[D]emonstrate[] to the commission¶s satisfaction that the following
comply with all requirements of chapter 55 of the Kansas Statutes
Annotated, and amendments thereto, all rules and regulations adopted
thereunder and all commission orders and enforcement agreements, if
the applicant is not registered with the federal securities and exchange
commission: (A) The applicant; (B) any officer, director, partner or
member of the applicant; (C) any stockholder owning in the aggregate
more than 5% of the stock of the applicant; and (D) any spouse, parent,
brother, sister, child, parent-in-law, brother-in-law or sister-in-law of
the foregoing.38

When an operator responsible for a noncompliant well applies each
year to renew its operator license, under (c)(4), the Commission reviews
the regulatory history of the applicant operator itself and each of the

requirements and must pass a mechanical integrity test periodically or otherwise be plugged. KAN.
ADMIN. REGS. § 82-3-407.
34. Jon Myers et al., Remarks at the Kansas Corporation Commission Regulations of the Oil &
Gas Industry in Eastern Kansas: Enforcement Policy and Practices (Aug. 4, 2017) (unpublished CLE
materials on file with the authors).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See supra note 2.
38. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-155(c)(4) (2015); see also KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 82-3-120(g).
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individuals identified in (c)(4). If the applicant or any of these individuals
is deemed responsible for a regulatory violation, such as maintaining an
inactive, unplugged well, the Commission will deny the application unless
the applicant agrees to take control of the well and plug it. Until the
Commission¶s recent decision in Agricultural Energy Services,39 in
determining the regulatory compliance of each of the identified
individuals in (c)(4), the Commission reviewed the regulatory histories of
all the licensed and formally licensed operators with which each individual
was associated. If the Commission deemed one of the identified
individuals to be ³associated´ with a licensee maintaining an inactive,
unplugged well on its license, it imputed the responsibility for the well to
the individual and therefore the applicant.
A hypothetical illustration of the typical case will aid the discussion.
Consider the following set of facts:
x 1999: Alpha Oil, Inc., a licensed operator, sells and transfers its wells
to other operators and ceases business. Alpha Oil fails, however, to
transfer the Ida #1 well, which is inactive.
x 2015: Finally discovering the Ida #1 well is inactive and unplugged,
the Commission serves Alpha Oil with a notice of violation at its
former resident agent¶s registered office, for failure to plug the Ida
#1. The Commission eventually obtains a penalty order against
Alpha Oil by default. The order requires Alpha Oil to plug the Ida
#1 well or place it back into service.
x 2017: Beta Oil, LLC applies to renew its operator license. The
Commission denies the renewal, citing Beta Oil¶s association with
Peter Oleum, who is a 5% non-managing member of Beta Oil. The
Commission cites the fact that Peter was a director of Alpha Oil,
which has the unplugged Ida #1 well on its operator license. The
Commission offers Beta Oil the option of adding the Ida #1 to its
operator license and having it plugged in order to receive a renewed
license.

Cases like this hypothetical are not uncommon.40 But as discussed in
the following Section, the Commission largely rejected such an
application of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155(c)(4) in Agricultural Energy
Services. It is unclear under Agricultural Energy Services whether, and
under what circumstances or standards, the Commission may impute the
regulatory liability of associated operators to applicants for new and
renewed operator licenses under the licensing statute.

39. See infra Part II.D.
40. See supra note 2.
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D. Agricultural Energy Services
On January 23, 2018, in Agricultural Energy Services, a divided
Commission overruled its previous practice of conditioning the renewal of
operator licenses on the acceptance of responsibility for the regulatory
violations of operators with which the applicant¶s corporate constituents
were formerly associated.41 The case arose in the typical fashion. In
March 2017, the Commission¶s staff issued a Notice of Denial of License
Renewal Application to Agricultural Energy Services (³AES´), stating
that the application was denied under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155(c)(4)
because AES ³appears to be associated with entities not in compliance
with Commission statutes, regulations, and orders,´ namely First National
Oil, Inc., which had an unplugged well on its expired license.42
AES filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plain
language of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155(c)(4) did not permit the
Commission¶s actions and that, as applied to AES, the statute violated due
process.43 The Commission staff responded and the Commission found
the following pertinent uncontroverted facts: (a) the application was
denied solely under subsection (c)(4); (b) the denial was based on the
staff¶s belief that AES was associated with First National Oil; (c) one of
AES¶s officers was also a director, along with his brother, of First
National Oil, and his father was an officer of First National Oil; (d) First
National Oil¶s operator license was suspended for regulatory
noncompliance related to an unplugged well.44
The Commission¶s staff defended its practice of imputing regulatory
liability on individuals ³associated´ with noncompliant operators under
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155(c)(4). It argued that the statute is in place to
ensure that an individual ³cannot incorporate or otherwise shift licensure
to avoid Commission regulations regarding abandoned wells, that the
statute only has meaning if the Commission¶s ability to deny licenses
extends beyond theories of corporate veil-piercing and alter ego, or that
[a]n artificial entity acts only through its officers, employees, and
agents.´45 The staff further urged that its interpretation is ³a state and
legislative interest´ related to the Commission¶s ³ability to get wells
plugged.´46

41. Agricultural Energy Services, Docket No. 17-CONS-3529-CMSC, 2018 Kan. PUC LEXIS
125, at *22 (Kan. Corp. Comm¶n Jan. 23, 2018).
42. Id. at *1.
43. Id. at *3.
44. Id. at *7±9.
45. Id. at *14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. Id. at *16.
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The Commission found that the staff¶s interpretation of Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 55-155(c)(4) was erroneous, stating, ³the plain reading of K.S.A.
55-155(c)(4) requires the relevant officer, director, partner, member,
stockholder or family member of the applicant to be personally noncompliant with Kansas law or Commission orders and enforcement
agreements before the license application can be denied on the basis of
this subsection.´47 One of the three Commissioners dissented, suggesting
that when read as a whole, the provisions of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155 may
provide a legal basis for the staff¶s interpretation.48 Commissioner
Albrecht further stated: ³[T]his matter raises a number of complex issues
of first impression, one of which is whether the plain meaning of K.S.A.
55-155 can or should be discerned on the flimsy record before the
Commission. I draw different conclusions from the evidence, therefore
summary judgment must be denied.´49
Agricultural Energy Services raises a number of issues. What does it
mean for an individual constituent of a license applicant to be ³personally´
noncompliant with statute or agency regulations or orders? Does it leave
room for the Commission to disregard the corporate entity of other
operators with which the individual has been associated? If so what
standards, procedural and substantive, should govern such an action? In
the Sections that follow, this article will examine the propriety of the
Commission staff¶s interpretation and application of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55155(c)(4) under principles of corporate, constitutional, and administrative
law, and propose a substantive test under which the Commission may
deny a license under (c)(4) based on the vicarious liability of the
applicant¶s constituents.
III. CONSTRAINTS ON STATES¶ POWER TO DISREGARD CORPORATE
FORMALITIES
The Commission expressed concern in its majority decision in
Agricultural Energy Services that the licensing statute should not be
interpreted to permit the Commission to disregard corporate formalities.50
Oil and gas exploration and production is a capital- and risk-intensive
Individual actors in the industry frequently organize
endeavor.51
47. Agricultural Energy Services, 2018 Kan. PUC LEXIS 125, at *17 (emphasis in original).
48. See id. at *23±24 (Albrecht, Comm¶r, dissenting).
49. Id. at *30.
50. As used in this article, ³corporate´ refers to limited liability business organizations generally,
rather than corporations exclusively, and includes reference to corporations, limited liability
companies, limited partnerships, limited liability partnerships, and any other entity that is presumed
separate from its owners and managers.
51. Appalachian Land Co. v. EQT Prod. Co., 468 S.W.3d 841, 843 (Ky. 2015) (³The extraction
of natural gas is a capital intensive process involving various technologies and extraction methods.´).
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themselves into some kind of limited liability corporate form, such as a
corporation, limited liability company, or limited partnership.
Consequently, applicants for operator licenses tend to be corporate entities
rather than individuals.52 The Commission¶s recent licensing cases,
particularly Agricultural Energy Services, thus present the question
whether the state, acting through a specialized regulatory body, may
exercise its power to disregard an applicant¶s corporate form (and
sometimes multiple corporate forms) to deny an oil and gas operator
license or impose plugging liability. As this Section will elucidate, the
question is less whether the state may exercise this power than what
procedures are necessary to do so. Possible constraints on the exercise of
this power arise under corporate, constitutional, and administrative law.
A. Corporate Law Constraints
1. The Bedrock Principle of Limited Liability
Kansas law empowers any person, singly or jointly with others, to
organize as a corporation,53 limited liability company,54 limited
partnership,55 or limited liability partnership.56 Each of these types of
business organization is a separate legal person from its owners.57 The
corporate person ³is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing
only in contemplation of law.´58 The corporate being and its owners are
³presumed separate and distinct, whether the corporation has many
stockholders or only one.´59 It follows that the debts and liabilities of a
corporate person are not the individual debts or liabilities of its owners.60
The officers, directors, or managers of a corporate person are likewise
separate and not individually responsible for corporate debts or

52. See sources cited supra note 2.
53. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6001(a) (2016).
54. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7673(a)±(b) (2015).
55. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56-1a151 (1999).
56. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-1001(a) (2010).
57. E.g., § 17-7673(b) (³A limited liability company formed under this act shall be a separate
legal entity, the existence of which as a separate legal entity shall continue until cancellation of the
limited liability company¶s articles of organization.´).
58. Dean Ops. v. One Seventy Assocs., 896 P.2d 1012, 1016 (Kan. 1995) (citing Land Grant Ry.
& Tr. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm¶rs, 6 Kan. 245, 253 (1870)); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89 (1985) (³[The corporation] is
no more than a name for a complex set of contracts among managers, workers, and contributors of
capital. It has no existence independent of these relations.´).
59. Amoco Chems. Corp. v. Bach, 567 P.2d 1337, 1341 (Kan. 1977).
60. Speer v. Dighton Grain, Inc., 624 P.2d 952, 958 (Kan. 1981) (citing Amoco Chems. Corp.,
567 P.2d at 1341).
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liabilities.61 The law thus limits the liability of owners to the amount of
their investments in the corporate being, and relatedly, the liability of
officers and directors to the liabilities arising from their own wrongful
acts. 62 The concept of limited liability is a fundamental general principle
of corporate law.63
As an initial matter, let us recall what limited liability is by way of an
illustration. Judge Frank Easterbrook and his coauthor Daniel Fischel
provide this simple one: ³A person who pays $100 for stock risks that
$100, but no more. A person [who] buys a bond for $100 or sells goods to
the firm for $100 on credit risks $100, but no more.´64 But why is
limitation beneficial? One court has explained that the concept ³has long
served useful business purposes, encouraging risktaking [sic] by
individual investors as well as overall convenience of financial
administration.´65 One theory holds that limited liability is essential to the
modern publicly held corporation with many small shareholders because,
without limited liability, every share of stock would place the owner¶s
entire personal assets at risk, causing investors to eliminate or reduce their
investments to a few, closely monitored firms.66 Other commentators
advance that limited liability makes organized securities markets possible
by allowing investors to uniformly value shares of stock. 67 This rationale
maintains that, without limited liability, different investors would attach
different values to the same shares of stock based on the investor¶s own
wealth and probability it could be reached in the event of corporate
default. Easterbrook and Fischel conclude that limited liability is

61. Galvan v. McCollister, 580 P.2d 1324, 1325 (Kan. 1978) (quoting McFeeters v. Renollet,
500 P.2d 47, 50 (Kan. 1972)); Lincoln Farm Supply, Inc. v. CT Implement Co., No. 106,162, 2012
WL 924860, at *5 (Kan. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2012) (citing Speer, 624 P.2d at 958).
62. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 58, at 89±90 (³The rule of limited liability means that the
investors in the corporation are not liable for more than the amount they invest.´); Speer, 624 P.2d at
958±59 (citing Kirk v. H.G.P. Corp., 494 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Kan. 1972)) (noting that ³a corporate
officer or director acting on behalf of a corporation is personally liable for damages caused by his
willful participation in acts of fraud or deceit to one directly injured´); McFeeters, 500 P.2d 47 at Syl.
¶ 2; Meehan v. Adams Enters., Inc., 507 P.2d 849, 851 (Kan. 1973); State ex rel. Sanborn v. Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc., 512 P.2d 416 at Syl. ¶ 7 (Kan. 1973).
63. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 58, at 89; see also United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S.
51, 61 (1998) (noting that the concept is ³deeply µingrained in our economic and legal systems¶´)
(quoting Douglas & Shanks, supra note 6, at 193).
64. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 58, at 90.
65. Valley Fin., Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 162, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Jonathan A.
Marcantel, Because Judges Are Not Angels Either: Limiting Judicial Discretion by Introducing
Objectivity into Piercing Doctrine, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 191, 193±94 (2011) (³Limited liability is a
bedrock feature of corporate law for it encourages diversification and liquidity, promotes market
efficiency, and decreases the need for monitoring agents and officers.´).
66. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 58, at 90 (citing Henry Manne, Our Two Corporation
Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 262 (1976)).
67. Id. at 92 (citing Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in
Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 129 (1980)).
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necessary to reduce the costs of separation and specialization of function
among a diverse group of agents who manage a firm and the owners who
invest in it, thus making large and publicly traded corporations possible.68
Easterbrook and Fischel also argue that limited liability benefits voluntary
creditors of firms as well as shareholders, because ³if limited liability were
not provided by law, firms would attempt to create it by contract,´ and the
default rule ³enables firms to obtain the benefits of limited liability at
lower cost.´69
2. Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Exception to Limited Liability
Another function of limited liability is to allow corporate persons to
externalize the costs of engaging in risky activities. 70 Although it is
unlikely that limited liability meaningfully contributes to excessive risktaking,71 courts and administrative agencies,72 in some circumstances,
seek to reduce the social costs of limited liability.73 The primary way
courts and administrative agencies have of reallocating risk from creditors
(voluntary and involuntary, such as tort victims) to corporate owners and
managers is by piercing the corporate veil.
The doctrine of veil piercing is an exception to the general rule of
limited corporate liability by which ³courts disregard the separateness of
the corporation and hold a shareholder responsible for the corporation¶s
action as if it were the shareholder¶s own.´74 What constitutes an
appropriate case in which to pierce the corporate veil is among the most
confusing questions in corporate law.75 No uniform standard exists for
determining whether a corporate form should be disregarded.76 Perhaps
68. See id. at 93±94.
69. Id. at 93.
70. Id. at 117.
71. Id. at 106 (³Our point is not that limited liability will never result in a socially excessive
amount of risk taking in situations involving voluntary creditors. Rather, we argue that it is unlikely
that any rule will lead to systematically excessive risk taking; indeed, it is unlikely that the legal rule
will matter much.´).
72. See generally Lindsey Simon, Chapter 11 Shapeshifters, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 233 (2016)
(discussing veil piercing by administrative agencies in the context of bankruptcy proceedings).
73. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 58, at 117; see, e.g., Valley Fin., Inc. v. United States, 629
F.2d 162, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (³On occasion, however, this concept [of limited liability] is abused,
and yields results contrary to the interests of equity or justice. Courts have not hesitated to ignore the
fiction of separateness and approve a piercing of the corporate veil when the corporate device
frustrates clear intendment of the law.´).
74. Simon, supra note 72, at 245 (quoting Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An
Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1036 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Amoco Chems. Corp. v. Bach, 567 P.2d 1337, 1341 (Kan. 1977) (³However, in an appropriate case
the corporate form will be disregarded and the corporation and its stockholders may be treated as
identical.´).
75. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 58, at 89.
76. Valley Fin., Inc., 629 F.2d at 172.
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the most prominent test is a three-pronged analysis formulated by
Frederick Powell in which the court evaluates: (1) whether the corporate
person is the ³alter ego´ or ³mere instrumentality´ of the owners; (2)
whether the corporate form has been used to perpetuate a fraud, wrong, or
injustice on the plaintiff; and (3) whether the plaintiff would suffer some
unjust loss or injury as a result of the corporate person¶s actions but for
piercing the veil.77 Except for a few general principles²such as the
proposition that veil piercing is an extraordinary action that should be
undertaken reluctantly and cautiously78²the development of the doctrine
across, and even within, jurisdictions has been somewhat haphazard.
Innumerable variations on Powell¶s classic formulation have been
adopted, leading to ³a legal quagmire´ of veil-piercing standards.79
According to Easterbrook and Fischel, ³[p]iercing seems to happen
freakishly. Like lightning, it is rare, severe, and unprincipled.´80
Kansas case law only slightly reflects the imprecision so often
criticized in the veil-piercing area. Like courts in most jurisdictions,81 in
Kansas the veil-piercing test has coalesced around a factors analysis. Yet
Kansas cases exist where a corporate veil is pierced without application of
any particular test.82 Kansas courts nevertheless assiduously follow
certain fundamental principles. Namely, Kansas courts hold that (1) the
power to pierce the corporate veil ³is to be exercised reluctantly and
cautiously,´ (2) ³the corporate entity can be disregarded if it is used to
77. Simon, supra note 72, at 246 (citing FREDERICK J. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY
CORPORATIONS 1±10 (1931); Cathy S. Krendl & James R. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil:
Focusing the Inquiry, 55 DENV. L.J. 1, 13 (1978).
78. See Simon, supra note 72, at 245; see, e.g., Amoco Chems. Corp., 567 P.2d at 1341 (³Power
to pierce the corporate veil is to be exercised reluctantly and cautiously.´).
79. Simon, supra note 72, at 246 (quoting Henry W. Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and
Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CAL. L. REV. 12, 15 (1925)).
80. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 58, at 89 (internal quotation marks omitted).
One commentator described the legal analysis as jurisprudence by metaphor or epithet. It
does not contribute to legal understanding because it is an intellectual construct, divorced
from business realities. The metaphors are no more than conclusory terms, affording little
understanding of the considerations and policies underlying the court¶s actions and little help
in predicting results in future cases . . . . As a result, we are faced with hundreds of
decisions that are irreconcilable and not entirely comprehensible. Few areas of the law have
been so sharply criticized by commentators.
Id. at 89 n.1 (citing PHILLIP BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
IN THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 8 (1983)). Jonathan Marcantel notes that:
[B]ecause these decisions are necessarily factually charged, they are largely more reflective
of the judge¶s personal opinion on the instant case as opposed to the judge¶s interpretation of
the general law. Thus, in terms of predictability and consistency, the tests have become only
slightly more sophisticated than the smell test.
Marcantel, supra note 65, at 197±98.
81. Marcantel, supra note 65, at 192.
82. See, e.g., Kirk v. H.G.P. Corp., 494 P.2d 1087 1090±91 (Kan. 1972) (piercing the veil of a
corporate defendant to impose liability for unplugged wells without reference to a detailed legal
standard).
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cloak or cover fraud or illegality or to work injustice, or if necessary to
achieve equity,´ and (3) the doctrine ³fastens liability on an individual or
corporation which uses a corporate entity merely as an instrumentality to
conduct its own business.´83 These basic rules clearly reflect at least two
of the elements of Powell¶s tripartite standard²whether the corporate
form is merely the owner¶s alter ego and whether it was used to perpetuate
fraud or injustice.84 The provision that a corporate form will be
disregarded if necessary to achieve equity also appears to embrace
Powell¶s third element²necessity of piercing the veil to prevent the
victim from suffering an unjust loss.85
The predominant test for piercing the veil applied by Kansas courts is
articulated in Amoco Chemicals Corp. v. Bach.86 There, the Kansas
Supreme Court set forth the following eight factors:
(1) [u]ndercapitalization of a one-[person] corporation,87 (2) failure to
observe corporate formalities, (3) nonpayment of dividends, (4)
siphoning of corporate funds by the dominant stockholder, (5)
nonfunctioning of other officers or directors, (6) absence of corporate
records, (7) the use of the corporation as a façade for operations of the
dominant stockholder or stockholders, and (8) the use of the corporate
entity in promoting injustice or fraud.88

This test has been widely followed.89 Although the Kansas test
speaks in terms of corporations, there is virtually no doubt that the alter
83. Serv. Iron Foundry, Inc. v. M.A. Bell Co., 588 P.2d 463, 473 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978) (citing
Amoco Chems. Corp., 567 P.2d 1337, 1341 (Kan. 1977); Kilpatrick Bros., Inc. v. Poynter, 473 P.2d
33, 41 (Kan. 1970)).
84. See supra text accompanying note 77.
85. See supra text accompanying note 77.
86. 567 P.2d 1337 (Kan. 1977).
87. While the test specifically focuses on undercapitalization of single-shareholder corporations,
the fact of ³single ownership alone will not support the alter ego theory and justify a disregard of the
corporate entity.´ Amoco Chems. Corp., 567 P.2d at 1341. Further, although early Kansas cases
decided before codification of the state¶s corporation code suggest otherwise, the code specifically
authorizes corporations incorporated, owned, and controlled by a single person. Id. (citing Adams v.
Morgan, 52 P.2d 643 (Kan. 1934) (overruled by Amoco Chems. Corp., 567 P.2d at 1337).
88. Id. at 1341±42.
89. See, e.g., Sampson v. Hunt, 665 P.2d 743, at Syl. ¶ 3 (Kan. 1983); Golconda Screw, Inc. v.
West Bottoms, Ltd., 894 P.2d 260, 268 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995); Kvassay v. Murray, 808 P.2d 896, 904
(Kan. Ct. App. 1991). Kansas courts have adopted a separate multifactorial analysis for determining
when to disregard the separateness of affiliated corporate entities (e.g., parent and subsidiary
corporations). Affiliate entity cases follow the same general principles as typical veil-piercing cases,
but consider these ten factors:
(1) whether the parent corporation owns all or a majority of the capital stock of the
subsidiary; (2) whether the corporations have common directors or officers; (3) whether the
parent corporation finances the subsidiary; (4) whether the parent corporation subscribed to
all of the capital stock of the subsidiary or otherwise causes its incorporation; (5) whether
the subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital; (6) whether the parent corporation pays the
salaries or expenses or losses of the subsidiary; (7) whether the subsidiary has substantially
no business except with the parent corporation, or no assets except those conveyed to it by
the parent corporation; (8) whether in the papers of the parent corporation, and in the
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ego and veil-piercing doctrines apply equally to other limited liability
business organizations, such as limited liability companies.90
In at least one case, Kansas courts have pierced the veil of limited
liability to impose liability for plugging oil and gas and water injection
wells on a corporate constituent. Kirk v. H.G.P. Corp.91 was an action for
judicial cancellation of an oil and gas lease brought by the owners of the
lease premises against the owner of the lease, H.G.P. Corporation.92
H.G.P.¶s majority shareholder and principal officer, director, and manager
was Claude Beets.93 The oil and gas leases at issue were H.G.P.¶s only
assets.94 The parties agreed to a partial settlement whereby H.G.P. agreed
to acquiesce in cancellation of the lease if it could remove its equipment,
plug the oil and injection wells, and restore the surface of the property
before the plaintiffs¶ claim for damages would be decided by the court.95
H.G.P. removed its equipment from the property, sold it to Beets, and
applied the proceeds to the balance of the corporation¶s debts to Beets.96
Although H.G.P. did plug some of the wells on the property, it did so
negligently and spilled crude oil, ³causing considerable damage.´97 The
plaintiffs amended their petition to add Beets as a defendant, and Beets
³moved for summary judgment, contending as a matter of law that he
could not be held personally liable for the obligations of the defendant
corporation.´98 The district court denied the motion and, following a trial
on the merits, found Beets ³personally liable for the plugging of the oil
wells.´99
In affirming the district court¶s ruling, the Kansas Supreme Court
applied multiple exceptions to the rule of limited liability. First, the court
held that Beets was directly liable for the tortious acts of H.G.P. in his
capacity as a director and officer because he willfully prioritized his own
statements of its officers, the subsidiary is referred to as such or as a department or division;
(9) whether the directors or executives of the subsidiary do not act independently in the
interest of the subsidiary but take direction from the parent corporation; and (10) whether the
formal legal requirements of the subsidiary as a separate and independent corporation are not
observed.
Dean Operations v. One Seventy Assocs., 896 P.2d 1012, 1017±18 (Kan. 1995).
90. Edwin W. Hecker, Jr. & Stanley N. Woodworth, Limited Liability Companies, in KANSAS
CORPORATION LAW & PRACTICE § 13.3.1(e) (5th ed. 2011) (collecting cases from other jurisdictions
where the limited liability of a limited liability company was pierced and discussing certain factors¶
applications in the context of limited liability companies).
91. 494 P.2d 1087 (Kan. 1972).
92. Id. at 1088±89.
93. Id. at 1089.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1089±90.
96. Id. at 1090.
97. Kirk, 494 P.2d at 1090.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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claims as creditor of the corporation ahead of the claims of the plaintiffs as
creditors.100 The court also held Beets personally liable in his capacity as
a shareholder under the doctrine of alter ego, finding H.G.P. was ³a mere
cloak´ by which Beets conducted his personal affairs.101
The court thus imposed responsibility for plugging the wells on the
property, and for damages to the surface from failed plugging attempts, on
Beets personally. While the court¶s discussion makes no mention of
particular factors on which it rested its decision, the opinion does
generally apply the broad policies of Powell¶s test²it found that H.G.P.
was the mere alter ego of Beets, that Beets used H.G.P. to perpetuate an
injustice on the plaintiffs, and that piercing the corporate veil was
necessary to secure a just determination of rights and liabilities.102
3. Veil Piercing by Administrative Agencies
i. In General
Courts are not the only adjudicative bodies that disregard corporate
forms; administrative agencies do it too. As one commentator on the
subject noted, however, ³[a]gency veil-piercing builds upon the doctrine¶s
general uncertainty in two ways.´ 103 First, there is a dearth of authority
granting administrative agencies veil-piercing power.104 Additionally,
even if agencies are empowered to pierce corporate formalities, it is
unclear what veil-piercing standards should apply in administrative
proceedings.105
Some agencies simply assume without analysis they have the
authority to pierce the veil. At least one judge has announced that limited
liability concepts ³lose much of their sacrosanctity when urged in the

100. Id. at 1090±91.
101. Id. The court noted the following:
The record shows the defendant corporation was a tool by which the appellant conducted his
own personal business. He was the principal stockholder, principal officer and manager of
the affairs of H. G. P., principal creditor, principal receiver of the assets, principal salvage
operator, and principal transferee of all funds secured by the corporation; in short, Beets was
the defendant corporation.
....
It is clear that H. G. P. was a mere cloak by which Beets conducted his personal affairs and
when the corporate entity becomes a conduit of an individual, the corporate veil may be
pierced by the court in the interest of securing a just determination of rights and liabilities.
Such a conclusion follows from the facts and circumstances as disclosed by the record.
Id. (emphasis in original).
102. Kirk, 494 P.2d at 1090±91.
103. Simon, supra note 72, at 247.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 247±48.
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context of regulated industries.´106 There seems to be little discussion
among courts about the authority of regulatory agencies to exercise veilpiercing powers, though Kansas courts have addressed the practice at least
once. In Kansas Commission on Civil Rights v. Service Envelope Co.,107
the Kansas Supreme Court held that the Commission had the power in an
administrative proceeding to enforce an employment discrimination award
against individual constituents of the corporate respondent on a theory of
direct liability or alter ego, but only if the individual officers, directors, or
employees were joined in the original agency proceedings.108 On the facts
of the case, however, the original agency discrimination proceedings did
not join the corporate shareholder and officer against whom the petitioner
sought to enforce the award.109 The court therefore denied the petitioner¶s
attempt to assert liability for the administrative award against the
shareholder and officer.110
Although not strictly a veil-piercing case, State ex rel. Fatzer v. Zale
Jewelry Co.111 illustrates courts¶ willingness to permit the state to
disregard corporate formalities in the regulation of professions.112 Fatzer
was an action in quo warranto, in which the state of Kansas (through its
then-attorney general, Fatzer) challenged Zale Jewelry Co.¶s right to
practice optometry.113 Zale Jewelry operated a jewelry store on the first
floor of its building.114 It also rented space in the rear of the building to
Marks, who was a Kansas licensed optometrist,115 and to Douglas Optical
Company, which manufactured prescription lenses.116 Under the lease
agreements, Marks and Douglas Optical promised not to compete with
Zale Jewelry, and Zale Jewelry agreed to handle the tenants¶ accounts
receivable and bookkeeping.117 Zale Jewelry widely advertised its jewelry
store¶s connection with the services of Marks and Douglas Optical.118
The state alleged that Zale Jewelry¶s lease arrangements with Marks and
Douglas Optical were a subterfuge and that Zale Jewelry was actually
106. Id. at 248 (citing Capital Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 734, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
107. 660 P.2d 549 (Kan. 1983).
108. Id. at 555.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 298 P.2d 283 (Kan. 1956).
112. Id. at 283.
113. Id. at 284.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 284±85.
117. State ex rel. Fatzer v. Zale Jewelry, 298 P.2d 283, 284 (Kan. 1956).
118. Id. at 288 (describing Zale Jewelry¶s signage and advertisements, such as: ³A New service
for you ± Now ± located right in our store you will find complete new optical dispensing offices;´
³You can add your optical purchase to your regular Zale¶s account;´ and ³You save from $50 to $20
on eye care´).
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engaged in the practice of optometry without a license.119 The Kansas
Supreme Court examined the evidence and agreed, holding the state,
through its attorney general, was empowered to look behind Zale
Jewelry¶s contractual arrangements and impose liability for practicing
optometry without a license.120
Service Envelope and Fatzer may provide some authority for agency
veil piercing in Kansas. But they do not address the second major
quandary in this area²what standard to apply. Cases from other
jurisdictions suggest that, in the context of regulated industries, virtually
no principled standards apply. The Federal Mine Safety and Health
Review Commission may have encapsulated agencies¶ attitudes regarding
administrative veil piercing when it said, ³the fiction of a corporate entity
must be disregarded whenever it has been adopted or used to defeat a
paramount public policy,´ and ³[n]or in cases involving the frustration of a
regulatory statute is the single enterprise entity or alter ego doctrine
subject to the strict standards that govern application of the doctrine in tort
or contract cases.´ 121
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that a state may
impose derivative liability for corporate actions on corporate owners under
two circumstances: either by a statute that clearly abrogates common law
principles of limited liability or by making the necessary showings under
the common law to pierce the corporate veil.122 Where there is such a
statute, it appears no showing of alter ego is necessary and thus no legal
standard for veil piercing is relevant. In United States v. Bestfoods,123 the
Court considered whether, under the federal Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(³CERCLA´), the United States could impose liability for environmental
cleanup costs on a parent corporation based solely on the fact the parent
exercised control over the operations of a subsidiary that generated the
waste.124 The Court answered ³no, unless the corporate veil may be
pierced.´125 CERCLA, the Court reasoned, gives no indication that it was
intended to replace limited liability provisions of corporate law, and ³the
failure of the statute to speak to a matter as fundamental as the liability
implications of corporate ownership demands application of the rule that
119. See id. at 287.
120. Id. at 289±90 (finding the lease arrangements to be ³a subterfuge´ and allowing the state to
oust Zale Jewelry from engaging in the practice of optometry).
121. Sec¶y of Labor v. NBC Energy, Inc., 4 FMSHRC 1860, 1872±73 (1982) (citing Capital Tel.
Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 734, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
122. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63±64 (1998).
123. 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
124. Id. at 55.
125. Id.
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µin order to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must speak
directly to the question addressed by the common law.¶´126 Accordingly,
the government was not permitted under CERCLA to impose derivative
liability on the parent corporation except by piercing the corporate veil of
the subsidiary.127 The Court did not address what law would govern the
veil-piercing standard in any given case.
Anderson Petro-Equipment, Inc. v. State128 is one recent case where a
state was held to be empowered by statute to impose regulatory liability on
an officer of the corporate operator of an oil well.129 The Texas Railroad
Commission brought an administrative action against Anderson Petro
Equipment, Inc. to plug an abandoned well.130 Meanwhile, before suit,
Anderson Petro forfeited its corporate privileges with the state for failing
to pay franchise taxes when due.131 The state of Texas then sued
Anderson Petro and its officer Curtis Ray Anderson to recover the costs of
plugging the well. The trial court ordered that Anderson Petro and
Anderson were jointly and severally liable for the plugging expenses, as
well as attorneys¶ fees, costs, and interest.132 Both defendants appealed
arguing Anderson could not be held personally liable for Anderson Petro¶s
debts.133 Because Anderson Petro forfeited its corporate charter after the
commission imposed liability on the company for plugging expenses,
Anderson Petro did not squarely pose the question whether the Texas
well-plugging statute could impose individual liability for plugging
costs.134 Rather, the issue was whether, if individual liability were so
imposed, it was extinguished when the corporation forfeited its
privileges.135 The Anderson Petro court cited a statute contained in
Texas¶s tax code making corporate officers liable for debts incurred by the
corporation during the time period after the franchise tax came due, and
before corporate privileges were revived.136 The court thus held, without
126. Id. at 63 (quoting United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)) (internal brackets
omitted).
127. Id. at 63±64 (³The Court of Appeals was accordingly correct in holding that when (but only
when) the corporate veil may be pierced, may a parent corporation be charged with derivative
CERCLA liability for its subsidiary¶s actions.´).
128. No. 03-13-000176-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 13075 (Tex. App. Oct. 22, 2013).
129. Id.
130. Id. at *3±4.
131. Id. at *2.
132. Id. at *1.
133. Id.
134. Anderson Petro-Equipment, Inc., 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 13075 *1 n.3.
135. Id. Texas case law contains a curious number of decisions (from 1994 alone) involving
corporate oil and gas operators who were assessed plugging liability after forfeiting corporate
privileges. See, e.g., Cain v. State, 882 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. App. 1994); Jonnet v. State, 877 S.W.2d 520
(Tex. App. 1994); Serna v. State, 877 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. App. 1994).
136. Anderson Petro, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 13075, at *15 (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
§ 171.255(a)).
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analysis, that the state was empowered by the tax code provision to
impose derivative liability for corporate obligations on Anderson.
Contrast Anderson Petro with a case from New York¶s highest court,
Morris v. State Department of Taxation & Finance.137 In Morris, the
State Department of Taxation obtained an order against the president of a
corporation for tax owed on the use of corporate assets in New York.138
There was no statutory authorization for imposing derivative liability for
corporate tax obligations on officers of the corporation. The New York
Court of Appeals set aside the order on the basis that the State Department
of Taxation could impose derivative liability only on a showing that the
corporate veil should be pierced, and it failed to establish the necessary
showing.139 Morris applied New York¶s common law veil-piercing
standard to the state¶s actions.140
McCall Stock Farms v. United States141 is another case where the
court required an administrative agency to apply a common law standard
to pierce the veil of a corporation. In McCall Stock Farms, the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Small Business Administration¶s
(³SBA¶s´) interpretation of the federal Debt Collection Act permitting the
agency to invoke the alter ego doctrine to aid administrative offsets of
loans made to corporate applicants.142 However, ³[s]ince the agency
interpretation did not go so far as to articulate a specific test for
determining alter ego status,´ the court reviewed the SBA¶s imposition of
liability for an offset of a corporate loan on a constituent of the corporate
borrower under a common law veil-piercing standard.143
137. 623 N.E.2d 1157 (N.Y. 1993).
138. Id. at 1159±60.
139. Id. at 1163.
140. See id. at 1160±61 (setting forth the general rules for piercing the corporate veil under New
York law). For a further discussion of sales tax liability of affiliate corporations, see generally Chris
Reitz, Comment, The Application of Kansas Sales Tax to Transactions Between Affiliated Companies,
42 U. KAN. L. REV. 461 (1994).
141. 14 F.3d 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
142. Id. at 1566±67.
143. See id. at 1567 (noting that the SBA did not articulate a specific test for determining alter ego
status). The McCall Stock Farms court considered the imposition of derivative liability in that case to
be ³reverse´ veil piercing, and devotes considerable attention to the propriety of reverse piercing. See
id. at 1568±69. The court ultimately declined to hold reverse veil-piercing improper, which places
McCall Stock Farms among the majority of courts on the issue. See id. at 1568. Kansas courts, on the
other hand, appear not to allow reverse piercing. See Lemus v. Horizon Express, Inc., No. 99,034,
2008 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 956, at *9 (Kan. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2008). The Kansas Court of
Appeals, in an unpublished and nonprecedential decision, stated its position as follows:
Sometimes called ³reverse veil-piercing´ this concept would make a corporation liable on
debts or actions of a shareholder except it was rejected by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which applied Kansas law in Floyd v. I.R.S., 151 F.3d 1295,
1298±1300 (10th Cir. 1998). We agree with the rationale and holding of the court in Floyd.
As that court noted, to allow the collection of claims against individual shareholders from
corporate assets would interfere with the legitimate expectations of corporate creditors, who
naturally expect that the corporation¶s assets will be available to pay its obligations.
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On first blush, Anderson Petro, Morris, and McCall Stock Farms
might seem irreconcilable, but Anderson Petro and Morris are clearly
distinguishable. In Anderson Petro, the state was empowered by express
statutory authority to look beyond the corporate veil to impose regulatory
liability on a corporate constituent.144 In Morris, however, the state had
no statutory authority to disregard the taxpayer¶s corporate form and
therefore had to satisfy the common law veil-piercing standards that any
private litigant would.145 McCall Stock Farms complicates this clear
dichotomy.146 There, the administrative agency interpreted its statutory
authority to permit it to disregard a debtor¶s corporate form but its
interpretation did not go so far as to articulate a specific test for doing
so.147 Unlike the statute in Anderson Petro, which simply stated that the
debts of a Texas corporation arising after franchise tax becomes due are
imputed to the corporation¶s shareholders, the statute at issue in McCall
Stock Farms did not expressly authorize summary veil piercing.148 The
agency thus had the authority to interpret the statute to allow piercing, but
it also had the concomitant obligation of articulating a specific piercing
standard.149
Applying these cases to Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155(c)(4), there is clear
express authority for imputing the regulatory violations of the enumerated
persons to a corporate applicant.150 There is not express authority,
however, for imputing to those enumerated individuals the regulatory
violations of other corporate operators with whom the individuals are or
were associated.151 Under the theory of Anderson Petro, the Commission
may arguably impute the violations of the corporate applicant¶s
constituents to the applicant without satisfying any specific test. The
Id. at *9. The court further noted, ³[i]f there is some limited circumstance in which reverse veilpiercing should be allowed, [the present] case certainly is not it.´ Id. at *9±10.
144. See Anderson Petro-Equip. Inc. v. State, No. 03-13-000176-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS
13075, at *9±10 (Tex. App. Oct. 22, 2013).
145. See Morris v. N.Y. State Dep¶t of Taxation & Fin., 623 N.E. 2d 1157, 1161±63 (N.Y. 1993).
146. See McCall Stock Farms, 14 F.3d at 1565±68.
147. See id. at 1566±67.
148. See id. at 1565.
149. See id. at 1565±67.
150. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-155(c)(4) (2017). This provision states that to receive an operator
license, an applicant must:
[D]emonstrate[] to the commission¶s satisfaction that the following comply with all
requirements of chapter 55 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, and amendments thereto, all
rules and regulations adopted thereunder and all commission orders and enforcement
agreements, if the applicant is not registered with the federal securities and exchange
commission: (A) The applicant; (B) any officer, director, partner or member of the applicant;
(C) any stockholder owning in the aggregate more than 5% of the stock of the applicant; and
(D) any spouse, parent, brother, sister, child, parent-in-law, brother-in-law or sister-in-law of
the foregoing.
Id.
151. See id.
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Commission lacks clear authority, however, to impute the violations of
other operators to the applicant¶s constituents. Thus, under the theories of
Morris and McCall Stock Farms, the Commission would have to articulate
a specific standard to impute the liability of other operators to the
applicant¶s constituents or apply the common law standard.
ii. Veil Piercing in Administrative Licensing Proceedings
In the business licensing context, even in the absence of express
statutory authority for imposing derivative liability, courts have upheld
license denials on the basis that agencies are not held to a strict standard in
disregarding an applicant¶s corporate form.152 In Capital Telephone Co. v.
FCC,153 for example, the circuit court affirmed the commission¶s denial of
a ³high-band paging´ license to Capital Telephone Co.154 Capital
appealed, arguing the commission improperly pierced its corporate veil in
reaching its decision without satisfying the prerequisites for veil
piercing.155 When Capital applied for an exclusive license of a certain
frequency, its sole owner and president, Bakal, also separately applied in
his personal capacity for an exclusive license of another frequency.156 A
third applicant, Air Page, applied for a license of the same frequency
requested by Capital.157 The commission granted Bakal¶s application but
denied Capital¶s (granting the license instead to Air Page) on the basis that
Capital was the alter ego of Bakal.158
According to the circuit court, ³[t]he Commission recognized the
injustice that would be done to Air Page if both the Bakal and Capital
applications were granted. This would, in effect, grant to one individual
the use of all the most desirable available high-band paging channels in
the . . . area´ and would leave Air Page left to compete with less desirable
low-band channels.159 ³In this situation,´ the court continued, ³to
conform to what it considered to be a fair and equitable distribution of the
available frequencies, the Commission took cognizance of the identity of
interest between Bakal and Capital and pierced the corporate veil of
Capital.´160 In affirming the commission¶s veil-piercing-by-fiat decision,
the Capital Telephone court articulated the general principle that ³courts
152. See, e.g., Capital Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 734, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1974); S.O.U.P., Inc. v. FTC,
449 F.2d 1142, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
153. 498 F.2d 734 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
154. Id. at 735±36.
155. Id. at 738.
156. Id. at 736.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 736±37.
159. Capital Tel., 498 F.2d at 736.
160. Id.
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have consistently recognized that a corporate entity may be disregarded in
the interests of public convenience, fairness and equity.´161 But it
concluded:
However, we need not pause to consider whether Capital would be
Bakal¶s alter ego under the strict standards of the common law alter ego
doctrine which would apply in a tort or contract action. The contest in
this case is over a license in a regulated industry and the applicable
standard appears in the statute, not in court decisions involving civil
suits.162

The applicable licensing statute at issue in Capital Telephone stated
in pertinent part that in considering applications for licenses, the
commission ³shall make such distribution of licenses . . . as to provide a
fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of radio service to each of the
same.´163 It appears that the statutory standard that supplanted the
common law veil-piercing standard is simply that licenses are to be
granted to foster a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of radio
service. Certainly, such a standard is less rigorous than any court¶s veilpiercing analysis would be. In other words, the commission was justified
in disregarding Capital¶s corporate form to achieve an equitable
distribution of radio service even though its actions would fail any
common law standard.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has similarly
upheld the Federal Trade Commission¶s denial of a nonprofit
corporation¶s motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis because the
corporation¶s members could personally afford the court costs.164 In a
very brief opinion affirming the Commission¶s ruling, the majority of the
court stated only that it would not comply with the statute governing in
forma pauperis appeals to grant the application.165 Two of the court¶s
panelists wrote in a concurring opinion166 that ³[t]he corporate form is a
convenient, organizational vehicle, but its convenience does not justify
161. Id. at 738 (citing Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939); Chi.,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Ass¶n, 247 U.S. 490, 500±01
(1918); Francis O. Day Co. v. Shapiro, 267 F.2d 669, 673±74 (D.C. Cir. 1959); United States v.
Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (E.D. Wis. 1905)). The Capital Telephone court
further clarified the rule in the following footnote: ³Where the statutory purpose could be easily
frustrated through the use of separate corporate entities a regulatory commission is entitled to look
through corporate entities and treat the separate entities as one for purposes of regulation.´ Id. at 738
n.10 (citing Gen. Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 855 (5th Cir. 1971)).
162. Id. (citing Gen. Tel. Co., 449 F.2d at 855; H.P. Lambert Co. v. Sec¶y of Treasury, 354 F.2d
819, 822 (1st Cir. 1965); Mansfield Journal Co. (FM) v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28, 37 (1950); Cent. & S.
Motor Freight Tariff Ass¶n, 273 F. Supp. 823, 831±32 (D. Del. 1967)).
163. Id. at 737 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1970)).
164. S.O.U.P., Inc. v. FTC, 449 F.2d 1142, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
165. Id.
166. The opinion actually refers to this separate opinion as a ³[s]tatement . . . in support of the
order of the court.´ Id. (Fahy, J., concurring).
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turning it into a vehicle also for avoiding the costs involved in a lawsuit as
if it were a pauper.´167
S.O.U.P., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission168 is notable, however,
for Chief Judge Bazelon¶s dissent.169 The dissent expressed concern that
the majority¶s holding ³may have the unfortunate effect of deterring the
use of corporations as vehicles for raising issues of great public
importance.´170 He further noted that ³[n]othing in this record indicates
that SOUP¶s effort to proceed in forma pauperis is in any way offensive to
the public interest. Nor does anyone assert that its application is a sham or
an abuse of this Court.´171
The dissenting opinion in S.O.U.P., Inc. essentially weighed the
public policy benefits of respecting the corporate entity and requiring
formal veil piercing against the public policy costs of requiring the agency
to undertake a full veil-piercing analysis. The Capital Telephone court
appeared to engage in a similar, though less plainly articulated, analysis.
Public policy is not, in contrast, one of the numerous considerations
contained in Kansas¶s common law veil-piercing test. Indeed, the public
policy consideration in agency piercing cases seems to take the place, to
an extent, of the equitable consideration in common law cases. In the
context of regulated industries, sound public policy will usually counsel in
favor of disregarding corporate formalities without undertaking a formal
veil-piercing analysis, even where to do so would undermine the accepted
economic policies underpinning limited liability.
What may be most troubling about administrative veil-piercing in
licensing cases is the lack of procedure. As illustrated above, regulatory
agencies are often not required to follow a particular substantive test in
determining whether to disregard a corporate licensee¶s formal entity in
licensing proceedings. It must be noted that traditional licensing cases,
like Capital Telephone, merely involve the granting or denial of a license
rather than the affirmative imposition of liability on a corporate
constituent. In this sense, they are not true veil-piercing cases although
they do involve the disregard of a corporate form. They are also
distinguishable from the Commission¶s application of Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 55-155(c)(4) in that the Commission not only denies a license by
ignoring corporate formalities but also effectively imposes affirmative
regulatory liability. The fact that cases like Capital Telephone and
S.O.U.P., Inc. do not involve liability imputation likely explains in part
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
449 F.2d 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1145 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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why those courts did not require greater procedural or substantive
protections of the applicant.
B. Constraints Imposed Under Constitutional Law
When an agency adjudicates an application for a business license, it
is deciding whether to grant a government benefit.172 In 1970, in
Goldberg v. Kelly,173 the United States Supreme Court recognized a duty
under the Fourteenth Amendment to review the process by which agencies
make decisions granting or revoking government benefits.174 The
Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall ³deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.´175 Unless there has
been an interference with one of the specified interests²life, liberty, or
property²no due process requirement exists.176 In other words, the
existence of a protected interest is the trigger for due process protections.
In analyzing agency adjudications of government benefits, courts ask if a
decision requires due process review at all before asking what process is
due.177
1. Determining Whether a Protected Interest Exists
The first step²determining whether any process is due²depends on
whether a life, liberty, or property interest is at stake. In answering this
question, courts have focused on the breadth of the decisionmaker¶s
discretion and the extent, if any, to which it is limited by rules or
standards.178 Ironically, where agencies are granted broad discretion to
provide or revoke an interest, courts do not impose due process
requirements in addition to the statutory or regulatory requirements
governing the action.179 Yet the more limited the agency¶s discretion (or,
stated another way, the more confining on the agency the applicable
statutory or regulatory standards), the more likely courts are to impose due
process requirements.180 One explanation for this seeming paradox is that
172. Tim Searchinger, Note, The Procedural Due Process Approach to Administrative Discretion:
The Courts’ Inverted Analysis, 95 YALE L.J. 1017, 1017 (1986).
173. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (superseded by statute as stated in Hudson v. Bowling, 752 S.E.2d 313,
321±22 (W. Va. 2013)).
174. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262±63 (1970).
175. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Kansas Constitution also provides certain due process
rights. See KAN. CONST. § 18 (³All persons, for injuries suffered in person, reputation or property,
shall have remedy by due course of law, and justice administered without delay.´).
176. Linda L. Munden, Comment, Retail Liquor Licenses and Due Process: The Creation of
Property Through Regulation, 32 EMORY L.J. 1199, 1202 (1983).
177. Searchinger, supra note 172, at 1017.
178. Id. at 1017±18.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1020. Searchinger continues:

292

Washburn Law Journal

[Vol. 57

due process protects only those interests the government has induced
people to rely on by creating a justifiable expectation that a benefit will be
provided upon the satisfaction of specific criteria.181 A ³reasonable
expectation[]´ of a benefit is not enough to trigger due process unless
there is a ³mutual understanding´ between the government and the
applicant that the benefit will be provided.182 In other words, to create a
protectable life, liberty, or property interest, the expectation a benefit will
be provided must be legitimized, or justified, by a government promise
that it will be conferred upon satisfaction of definite criteria.183
Courts often refer to government benefits that do not rise to a
protected property right as ³privileges.´ 184 If a benefit is merely a
privilege, it is terminable or revocable without process when it ceases to
serve the public interest.185 Differentiating between a privilege and a right

If parole boards, business licensing commissions, or social security officials exercise
standardless discretion, unencumbered by procedures, and without obligations to explain
their decisions, they have no constitutional obligation to follow careful procedures. But if
they already implement specific statutory, regulatory or internal standards and procedures,
they must also follow the extra requirements of due process. In Hewitt v. Helms, Justice
Rehnquist noted the paradox of inferring due process rights from procedural rules: ³The
creation of procedural guidelines to channel the decisionmaking of prison officials is, in the
view of many experts in the field, a salutary development. It would be ironic to hold that
when a State embarks on such desirable experimentation it thereby opens the door to
scrutiny by the federal courts, while States that choose not to adopt such procedural
provisions entirely avoid the strictures of the Due Process Clause.´
Id. at 1021±22 (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471 (1983)).
181. Id. at 1034±35. This so-called ³reliance theory´ has been criticized as a justification for
courts¶ approaches to granting due process only where agency decisions are bound by standards or
rules. See id. at 1034±36.
182. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442±43 (1979) (finding that respondents had a reasonable
expectation that they would be permitted to represent their clients in Ohio courts, but that the rules of
the Ohio Supreme Court did not create a mutual understanding that permission would be granted
because authority to approve a pro hac vice application was consigned to the discretion of the trial
court). As discussed in this Section, a mutual understanding may arise by statutory language requiring
the state to grant a license where certain minimum criteria are met. See, e.g., Rydd v. State Bd. of
Health, 451 P.2d 239, 247±48 (1969) (holding a licensee for a day care center had a protectable
property interest in the license because the license was one which the state must grant if the applicant
meets certain minimum requirements).
183. Leis, 439 U.S. at 442±43. Another commentator has observed that courts are more likely to
find an entitlement (e.g., a property interest) where the benefit possesses many characteristics
traditionally associated with property, such as ³the right to possess the thing, to use and manage it, to
collect any income it generates, to sell it or give it away and keep the capital, to be secure from
expropriation by others, and to transmit it to one¶s successors.´ Munden, supra note 176, at 1203. Per
Munden, ³[w]hen licenses carry a large number of the rights described in [this] model, they are more
clearly property interests that will trigger the due process clause.´ Id. at 1204.
184. See Steve Oxenhandler, Comment, Taxicab Licenses: In Search of a Fifth Amendment,
Compensable Property Interest, 27 TRANSP. L.J. 113, 117 (2000); e.g., Rocky Mt. Rogues, Inc. v.
Town of Alpine, 375 F. App¶x 887, 894±95 (10th Cir. 2010) (³There is no vested right in a licensee to
continue in the liquor business beyond the expiration of the date of the license under which he
operates. A liquor license is a mere privilege, which is at all times in the control of the legislature.´)
(quoting Albertson¶s, Inc. v. City of Sheridan, 33 P.3d 161, 167±68 (Wyo. 2001)).
185. See Robert H. Nelson, Private Rights to Government Actions: How Modern Property Rights
Evolve, 2 U. ILL. L. REV. 361, 362 (1986).

2018]

Imputing Regulatory Failures in Oil and Gas Licensing

293

often turns on courts¶ interpretations of the statute creating the expectation
of the government benefit. A statute that endows the licensing agency
with unfettered discretion in granting applications does not create in the
applicant a legitimate claim to a property interest in the license.186 In
contrast, where the license sought is one that the state must grant if the
applicant meets certain minimum requirements, courts will find a
legitimate claim of entitlement and thus a protectable property interest in
the license.187
Two Kansas cases illuminate the dividing line between a licensing
statute that creates a privilege and one that creates a property interest.188
In Kansas Racing Management, Inc. v. Kansas Racing Commission,189
applicants for a license under the Kansas Parimutuel Racing Act to operate
a greyhound or horse racing business appealed the Kansas Racing
Commission¶s denial of their application in favor of another applicant.190
The relevant issue on appeal was whether the Commission violated the
applicants¶ due process rights by refusing to disclose investigative reports
conducted on the applicants¶ constituents and provide the applicants an
opportunity to present evidence and witnesses regarding the reports.191
As in the typical case, the court began its due process analysis by
questioning whether the applicants had a property or liberty interest in
being awarded a license such that the procedural or substantive
requirements of due process would attach.192 The Act granted the
Commission discretion in granting greyhound or horse racing licenses.
The court excerpted the pertinent provision as follows:

186. See Kan. Racing Mgmt., Inc. v. Kan. Racing Comm¶n, 770 P.2d 423, Syl. ¶ 5 (Kan. 1989).
187. Zimmerman v. Bd. of Cty. Comm¶rs, 264 P.3d 989, 1002 (Kan. 2011) (citing Kan. Racing
Mgmt., Inc., 770 P.2d at 432).
188. See id.
189. 770 P.2d 423 (Kan. 1989).
190. Id. at 426±27.
191. Id. The Act permitted the Commission to receive criminal and background investigative
information on applicants and their constituents for purposes of determining an applicant¶s
qualifications for licensure. Id. at 428±30 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-8804(n)±(o) (1988)).
192. Id. at 431±32. Although not directly relevant to the instant discussion, the applicants¶
argument that they had a liberty interest is worth noting. The argument focused on the effect of the
investigative reports received by the Commission on the reputations of the applicants. Id. at 433. The
court stated the general rule as follows:
The concept of ³liberty´ is broad and includes the freedom to work and the protections of
the person¶s good name. A person may [not] be deprived of a ³liberty´ interest without due
process if that person¶s standing in the community is damaged; if his reputation, honor, or
integrity are questioned; or if a stigma or other disability is imposed upon him which
forecloses his freedom to obtain and hold another job.
Id. (internal citations omitted). The court found no evidence that the applicants were stigmatized by
the investigative reports. Id. It found they were not prejudiced in similar applications in other states
because the Commission¶s decision to deny their Kansas licenses was discretionary and not based on
their unfitness. Id.
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If an application is found to be in compliance [with the provisions of the
Act] and the commission finds that the issuance of a license would be
within the best interests of horse and greyhound racing within this state
from the standpoint of both the public interest and the horse or
greyhound industry, as determined solely within the discretion of the
commission, the commission may issue an organization license to the
applicant.193

The court summarized the statute thusly, ³[i]n other words, the
Commission is not statutorily required to grant an organizational license
even though the applicant is found to be in compliance with statutory
requirements.´194 Because the Commission had no obligation to grant a
license to any applicant, regardless of the sufficiency of the application,
applicants could have only a unilateral expectation of receiving a license
that could not give rise to a legitimate claim of entitlement to a license.195
While there was no legitimate claim to entitlement to a license, the
court noted that the Act created a property interest in the renewal of a
license that was previously granted.196 The court construed a provision in
the Act granting a licensee the right to judicial review of a decision to
deny renewal of the license as creating a property interest in the
licensee.197 It concluded that ³if the Commission refuses to renew that
license, the holder has a protected right to notice and a due process
hearing.´198
In reaching its holding, the Kansas Racing Management court
distinguished the earlier case Rydd v. State Board of Health,199 where the
court found a legitimate claim of entitlement to an award of a daycare
license.200 Rydd involved the Board of Health¶s denial of the applicant¶s
application without notice or a hearing.201 The reason given for the denial
was that the applicant would ³not be able to give the proper amount of
time´ to the children nor ³be of the proper temperament for looking after

193. Id. at 427 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-8813(e) (1988)) (modification and emphasis in
original).
194. Id.
195. Kan. Racing Mgmt., 770 P.2d at 433. The court cited Curtis Ambulance v. Shawnee Cty. Bd.
of Comm’rs, in which the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to recognize a property interest in a
disappointed low bidder for a county contract because underlying state law permitted the county to
exercise discretion in awarding or rejecting bids. 811 F.2d 1371, 1384±85 (10th Cir. 1987). Because
the county¶s authority to reject bids was not ³sufficiently circumscribe[d],´ by statute or other law, the
bidder could not establish a ³mutually explicit understanding´ giving rise to a legitimate claim of
entitlement to the contract. Id.
196. Kan. Racing Mgmt., 770 P.2d at 434.
197. Id. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-8815(l) (1988)).
198. Id.
199. 451 P.2d 231 (Kan. 1969).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 241.
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children.´202 Rydd held the applicant was entitled to due process of law in
adjudication of her license application, because she had a legitimate
expectation of receiving the license, and that due process in this context
required notice and an opportunity for a hearing before the board rendered
its decision on the application.203 According to the court in Kansas
Racing Management, the result in Rydd was justified, because ³the license
for a day care center was within the category of licenses which the State
must grant if the applicant meets certain minimum requirements.´204
Therefore, Rydd differs from Kansas Racing Management, because the
applicant in Rydd had a justified claim of entitlement to a license.205
2. Procedural Due Process Requirements
Where courts find a property interest in a government benefit, like a
business license, the analysis turns to what process is due under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Due process has two components: procedural
and substantive.206 This Section will focus on the procedural component.
The essence of procedural due process is reasonable notice and an
opportunity to be heard.207 It has been posited that process¶s value is ³that
it minimizes the risk of µerror¶ in the µtruthfinding process.¶´208 Other
commentators argue ³process values´ are broader and include protecting
individual dignity, equality, and responsiveness to a ³democratic
morality¶s demand for participation in decisions affecting individual and
group interests.´209 Maximum procedural due process would encompass
all the elements of a criminal proceeding, including the rights to notice, a
neutral tribunal, confront and cross-examine witnesses, present evidence,
assistance of counsel, and a speedy and public jury trial.210 But, the scope

202. Id.
203. Id. at 246.
204. Kan. Racing Mgmt., 770 P.2d at 432 (emphasis added).
205. See Zimmerman v. Bd. of Cty. Comm¶rs, 264 P.3d 989, 1002, Syl. ¶ 10 (Kan. 2011)
(discussing Rydd and Kansas Racing Management, holding that ³[a]n applicant has no vested rights in
a conditional use permit when its issuance depends upon the discretionary approval of a governmental
authority.´).
206. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994).
207. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267±68 (1970).
208. See Searchinger, supra note 172, at 1036 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976)).
209. Toni M. Massaro & Thomas L. O¶Brien, Constitutional Limitations on State-Imposed
Continuing Competency Requirements for Licensed Professionals, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 253, 293
n.149 (1983) (quoting Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44
U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 49±50 (1976)). This criticism is particularly directed toward the Supreme Court¶s
procedural due process analysis under Mathews v. Eldridge. Id; see infra text accompanying notes
216±217.
210. See Munden, supra note 176, at 1204; Massaro & O¶Brien, supra, note 209, at 292.
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of the due process requirement depends on the particular facts of each
case.211
The Supreme Court set forth the fundamental principles of procedural
due process in Goldberg v. Kelly.212 The Court explained that the extent
to which procedural due process must be afforded is ³influenced by the
extent to which [the recipient] may be µcondemned to suffer grievous
loss,¶´ and ³whether the recipient¶s interest in avoiding that loss
outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication.´213
Accordingly, consideration of what procedural due process may require
under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of
the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the
private interest that has been affected by governmental action.214
Goldberg clarified that ³[i]n a wide variety of situations, it has long
been recognized that where harm to the public is threatened, and the
private interest infringed is reasonably deemed to be of less importance, an
official body can take summary action pending a later hearing.´215 Later,
in Mathews v. Eldridge,216 the Court articulated a more specific
framework for procedural process that is still followed today. Eldridge
explained that determination of the procedural due process that must be
afforded in a given case turns on three factors: (1) the private interest that
will be affected, (2) ³the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the process used,´ and (3) the probable value of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards.217

211. Massaro & O¶Brien, supra, note 209, at 292.
212. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
213. Id. at 262±63 (1970) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 263 n.10 (quoting R.A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1962)).
Goldberg held that an evidentiary hearing must precede the termination of welfare benefits. Id. at 266.
The important factor was the impact on the welfare recipients after termination of their benefits
because the recipients relied on the benefits for basic necessities like food and shelter. Id. at 265.
Massaro and O¶Brien synthesized the Goldberg Court¶s definition of an evidentiary hearing as
involving:
[T]imely and adequate notice detailing reasons for the proposed termination; an effective
opportunity to defend by confronting adverse witnesses and presenting arguments and
evidence; retained counsel, if desired; an impartial decisionmaker; a decision resting solely
on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing; and a statement of reasons for the
decision and the evidence on which the decisionmaker relied.
Massaro & O¶Brien, supra note 209, at 293 n.144 (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266±71).
216. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
217. Id. at 335; accord. Darling v. Kan. Water Office, 774 P.2d 941, 945 (Kan. 1989) (citing
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335). Eldridge held that
termination of disability benefits requires only a post-termination hearing. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 323.
The Court recognized that disability benefits recipients had other sources of income, making the
disabled worker¶s need ³less than that of a welfare recipient.´ Id. at 342; cf. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at
265.
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A court evaluating the procedural aspects of the Kansas Corporation
Commission¶s denials of license renewals would apply the Eldridge
standard. The Kansas Supreme Court has noted, in dicta, that the
appropriate procedure for adjudications of denial of license renewals is
notice and a pre-denial hearing on the grounds for denial.218 Before
specifically discussing what procedural safeguards the Commission should
follow in denying an operator license based on the regulatory history of
the applicant¶s constituents in their personal and representative capacities
with other licenses, it is necessary to review the requirements of
substantive due process in general and in cases of government-imposed
vicarious or indirect liability.
3. Substantive Due Process Requirements
Due process is not merely a procedural safeguard. Intertwined with
the concept of procedural due process is substantive due process.219
Roughly defined, substantive due process is ³the constitutional guaranty
that no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property for
arbitrary reasons, such a deprivation being constitutionally supportable
only if the conduct from which the deprivation came is proscribed by
reasonable legislation . . . reasonably applied.´220 Substantive due process
thus protects a person from arbitrary action, ³and the applicable standard
is one of reasonableness.´221
Early Kansas cases have applied this test of reasonableness to statutes
intended for the regulation of oil and gas activities. In State v. Lebow,222
the court articulated the general principle that ³the test of validity [of a
statute] within the police power is whether or not the regulations
prescribed are reasonable.´ 223 The test of reasonableness ³is whether the
218. Kan. Racing Mgmt., Inc., v. Kan. Racing Comm¶n, 770 P.2d 423, 434 (Kan. 1989).
219. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 861±62 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens¶s conception of substantive due process is as ³a forward-looking methodology´ that
considers ³the sociopolitical landscape of a modern society.´ Lahny R. Silva, In Search of a Second
Chance: Channeling BMW v. Gore and Reconsidering Occupational Licensing Restrictions, 61 U.
KAN. L. REV. 495, 513 (2012) (citing McDonald, 561 U.S. at 876±77, 873).
220. Darling v. Kan. Water Office, 774 P.2d 941, 945±46 (Kan. 1989) (citing 16A AM. JUR. 2D
Constitutional Law § 816 (1979)).
221. Vaughan v. Kan. State Bd. of Nursing, 2016 WL 758348, at *13 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016); see
also Searchinger, supra note 172, at 1032±33 (³One argument might be that substantive due process
protects only against discrimination and that a fundamental liberty right to be free from discrimination
emanates from the due process clauses or from other constitutional guarantees. But the term
µdiscrimination¶ has little inherent meaning. The right to be free from discrimination is only the right
not to be disadvantaged for invidious or arbitrary reasons. In Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,
for example, the Supreme Court applied the due process clause to strike down a law governing the
distribution of welfare benefits solely because it distinguished between potential recipients µwithout
any rational basis.¶ The only liberty right at stake was the right not to be disadvantaged arbitrarily.´).
222. 280 P. 773 (Kan. 1929).
223. Id. at 775.
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attempted regulation makes efficient constitutional guarantees and
conserves rights, or is destructive of inherent rights.´224 It further requires
there be ³some clear, real, and substantial connection between the
assumed purpose of the enactment and the actual provisions thereof.´225
Lebow upheld, under the Fourteenth Amendment, a statute making it
unlawful to permit salt water or oil to escape onto the ground from a well
against an attack under substantive due process, finding that the state had
the police power to protect the purity of streams, wells, and lakes from
pollution, and that the instant statute had a ³clear, real, and substantial
connection´ with this purpose.226
In Winkler v. Anderson,227 the Kansas Supreme Court similarly
upheld the constitutionality of a statute imposing a minimum setback
requirement for newly drilled oil and gas wells from railroad rights of
way.228 The court acknowledged that enforcement of the statute would
render the plaintiff¶s oil and gas lease ³entirely valueless,´ but found that
the state had a legitimate interest in protection of railway rights of way
from being impeded by oil and gas operations in furtherance of the
common convenience, prosperity, and welfare.229 The court held the
statute¶s requirements were reasonable in light of the state¶s interest in
regulating oil and gas development.230
To synthesize these principles, substantive due process analysis
requires ³a case-by-case balancing of the nature of the individual interest
infringed, the importance of the government interest furthered, the degree
of infringement and the sensitivity of the government entity responsible
for the action to more carefully tailored alternative means of achieving its
goal.´231 At its heart, substantive due process analysis is a balancing of
the governmental interest at stake in a particular case with the individual
interest at stake. If the government¶s interest is substantial enough to

224. Id.
225. Id. at 775.
226. Id. at 776.
227. 177 P. 521 (Kan. 1919).
228. Id. at 521.
229. Id. at 522 (citing State v. Wilson, 168 P.679, 682 (Kan. 1917)).
230. Id. Regarding the potential effects of oil and gas activity, the court noted,
[W]hile oil and gas wells are not nuisances per se, and the business of drilling and operating
them is ordinarily legitimate and harmless, it is conceivable that they may become
detrimental in a high degree. The greed for mineral in a rich field becomes insatiate. Steam
and electric railway rights of way may be exploited, and unless the works, structures,
establishments, activities and products of mining operations be kept at a safe distance from
railway tracks, life and property might be endangered, commerce impeded, and the general
welfare seriously affected.
Id.
231. Darling v. Kan. Water Office, 774 P.2d 941, 946 (Kan. 1989) (citing Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978)).
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justify infringing the individual¶s life, liberty, or property interest, the
government may do so in a manner that is rationally related to the
government¶s interest.232
i. Substantive Due Process and Administrative Licensing
Licenses granted to any applicant that meets the statutory criteria are
the least protected.233
Relatedly, the more traditional property
characteristics a license has (e.g., exclusive possession and use; right to
transfer), the stronger the protections it receives from due process.234
Professor Lahny Silva has explored another aspect of due process in
the context of licensing adjudications: the effect of the licensee¶s past
conduct.235 Silva argues that state occupational licensing policies that
disqualify applicants on the basis of their nonviolent criminal histories
violate due process requirements articulated by the Supreme Court in
BMW of North America v. Gore.236 Gore established the constitutional
standard for substantive due process review of punitive damages
awards.237 In Gore, the Court considered both the procedural due process
limitations on punitive damages awards and the substantive limitations on
the amount of awards. The procedural due process principle developed
under Gore ³established a fair notice test for reviewing civil penalties.
Lower courts are to consider (1) whether the person received fair notice
that her conduct will subject her to punishment, and (2) whether she
received fair notice of the severity of the penalty that a state may impose
for that conduct.´238 As for substantive due process limitations, the Court
evaluated the reasonableness of the punitive damages judgment and set
forth three ³guideposts´ for lower courts to follow in evaluating similar
awards and awards of civil penalties:
(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant¶s conduct, (2) the
ratio of punitive damages to the actual and potential harm that the
plaintiff and other conceivable victims suffered, and (3) an inquiry into
how punitive damage awards compare with the civil and criminal
penalties that had been or could be imposed for comparable
misconduct.239

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997).
Id. at 1200±01, 1209±14.
Id. at 1202±05; see also Oxenhandler, supra note 184, at 116±17.
See generally Silva, supra note 219.
517 U.S. 559 (1995); Silva, supra note 219, at 500±01.
Silva, supra note 219, at 522.
Id. at 523.
Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 578±86) (internal citations omitted).
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Silva urges that these same procedural and substantive safeguards be
applied in adjudications of occupational license applications.240 Silva¶s
analysis would recognize the fact that most criminal offenders are not
given fair notice of the collateral consequences (such as future
disqualification for an occupational license) that a criminal conviction
entails.241 She would also have agencies apply the Gore guideposts in
determining whether to restrict licensing on the basis of a past criminal
conviction by considering: (1) the reprehensibility of the underlying
conduct, (2) the proportionality of the severity of the underlying criminal
conduct to the harm to the applicant of license denial, and (3) the affect, if
any, such a criminal history would have under other jurisdictions¶
licensure policies.242 Although Silva¶s analysis is limited to the collateral
consequences of criminal convictions in licensure proceedings, it is
instructive to the present discussion. Like the class of license applicants
Silva discussed, applicants for operator licenses or renewals of licenses
before the Commission are often denied on the basis of their history of
regulatory compliance (or the histories of persons deemed associated with
the applicants).
ii. Due Process Where Statute Imposes Derivative Liability
Maine¶s highest court considered the circumstances under which the
state may constitutionally impose vicarious liability on one legal person
for the acts of another in Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental
Improvement Commission.243 In Portland Pipe Line, an oil pipeline
corporation and ten major oil companies brought a declaratory judgment
action seeking a determination that Maine¶s Coastal Conveyance Act
violated substantive due process (facially and as applied) by imposing
³absolute´ vicarious liability on oil terminal facilities for spills caused by
oil carriers ³destined for´ the facility.244 Under the Act, the state ³need
only plead and prove the fact of the prohibited discharge or other polluting
240. Id. at 530.
241. Id. at 531.
242. Id. at 532±33.
243. 307 A.2d 1 (Me. 1973).
244. Id. at 10±11 (citing ME. STAT. tit. 38, § 552 (1970)). The plaintiffs also argued the Act¶s
procedural provisions were inadequate under procedural due process. Id. at 14±16. The Act provided
for an ³informal´ arbitration proceeding where rules of evidence were not binding to determine
terminal operators¶ vicarious liability for acts of carriers. Id. at 14. Portland Pipe Line recited the
familiar rules of procedural due process that a ³judicial proceeding is not an element of due process[,]
procedural due process requires no particular form of procedure[, and t]he rules of evidence are not
binding on administrative bodies as they are empowered by statute to receive evidence not ordinarily
admissible in judicial proceedings.´ Id. (citations omitted). The court declined to rule on the
plaintiff¶s procedural due process claim, however, because the commission had not yet adopted
arbitration procedures or conducted arbitrations. Id.
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condition and that it . . . was attributable to carriers or others for whom the
licensee [terminal] is responsible.´245
Plaintiffs argued that vicarious liability may be imposed without
violating due process guarantees only in cases where there is ³a control
relationship´ between the acting party and the person held liable.246
Because the plaintiff pipeline company and oil companies did not
necessarily have a control relationship with oil carriers destined for their
terminals,247 they asserted that they were protected by due process from
absolute vicarious liability for the acts or omissions of such carriers.248
The court disagreed because ³in our view the µcontrol relationship¶ cases
cited by plaintiffs are not an exhaustive list of instances where vicarious
liability may be constitutionally imposed.´249 The court cited Atlantic
Coast Line Railroad v. Riverside Mills,250 a Supreme Court case
upholding the constitutionality of the Carmack Amendment, under which
a railroad receiving goods to be shipped over multiple rail lines was made
liable for damage to the goods while in the hands of subsequent
carriers.251 The amendment imposed vicarious liability on initial rail
carriers, thereby abrogating both common law principles and typical
contract provisions between carriers that would have limited an initial
carrier¶s liability for goods once they passed beyond its line.252 The
Atlantic Coast Line Court upheld the amendment¶s imposition of vicarious
liability as constitutional.253
The Supreme Court¶s reasoning in Atlantic Coast Line is critical to
understanding Portland Pipe Line and the operation of substantive due
process in regulation of industry. Per the Portland Pipe Line court:

245. Id. at 10 (citing ME. STAT. tit. 38, § 552).
246. Id. at 17.
247. By way of background, the court explained the relationship of the plaintiff pipeline company
and oil companies in a footnote:
Pipe Line does not own, charter, or have control of any of the vessels destined for its
terminal. Since it is a common carrier it may not refuse to transport the oil tendered at its
South Portland terminal. It has no possessory interest in the oil. The oil companies, in
varying degrees, receive oil from vessels not owned, leased or controlled by them. Some of
these terminals off-load oil owned by other companies. Thus Pipe Line, and to some extent
the other plaintiffs, are held liable for acts of vessels in which they have no ownership
interest and over which they exercise no control. Insofar as the Pipe Line is concerned, it
engages in an involuntary relationship with the ships destined for its terminal because of its
inability to refuse to off-load and transport the cargoes of these vessels.
Id. at 17 n.30.
248. Id. at 17.
249. Portland Pipe Line, 307 A.2d at 17.
250. 219 U.S. 186 (1911).
251. Id. at 205.
252. Id. at 196.
253. Id. at 207.
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The Court stressed the mutually advantageous relationship of the
railroads. Although independently managed, they were cooperating in a
profit-making enterprise. The Court saw no constitutional infirmity in
imposing liability on one railroad for the acts of another in order to
further a valid public policy. That policy was to facilitate recovery by a
shipper who would be otherwise forced to determine on what line the
damage to his goods occurred and maintain litigation in a distant
forum.254

The government policy to facilitate shippers¶ recoveries was
sufficient to justify imposition of vicarious liability.255 For the Portland
Pipe Line court, the ³seeming inequity´ of the Atlantic Coast Line holding
is understandable in view of the ³business association´ among railroad
carriers.256 The railroads ³had the facilities and were free to institute
procedures where, among themselves, primary liability could be
accurately located.´257 Thus, according to the Maine Supreme Court:
Atlantic Coast Line stands for the proposition that government, in
further a valid policy, may constitutionally impress vicarious liability on
one party to a µbusiness association¶ for the acts of another party to that
association, where the party held liable has the means, within the
association, to ultimately place primary liability upon the party causing
the loss.258

The Portland Pipe Line court synthesized the following rule: it is
constitutional under substantive due process for the state to impose
vicarious liability on a party engaged in business for the acts of a business
associate when (1) both parties ³are engaged in a mutually beneficial
relationship,´ (2) within the relationship there is adequate opportunity to
locate the primary liability among the business associates, and (3) the
imposition of liability is in furtherance of a valid public policy.259
Applying this framework to the vicarious liability provision of the Coastal
Conveyance Act, the court found the Act¶s prime purposes were the
speedy settlement of third-party claims and clean-up of oil spills, both of
which were furthered by the imposition of vicarious liability.260
Curiously, however, the court did not specifically find that carriers and
terminals were engaged in a mutually beneficial business association in
which the associates could locate primary liability. On the contrary, the
court noted that because carrier vessels move in and out of Maine waters

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Portland Pipe Line, 307 A.2d at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 18±19.
Portland Pipe Line, 307 A.2d at 19.
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they may not always be amenable to suit.261 The Portland Pipe Line court
nevertheless upheld the statutory imposition of vicarious liability under
substantive due process because ³the imposition of vicarious liability was
a reasonable method of furthering´ the objectives of the Act.262
C. Administrative Law Constraints
As an administrative agency, the Commission¶s actions are subject to
constraints imposed by judicial review and principles of administrative
law. The two seminal cases concerning review of agency actions by the
judicial branch are Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner263 and Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe.264 In Abbott Laboratories, the
Supreme Court held the law provides for judicial review of final agency
actions to one ³suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute,´ and the right to judicial review will not be cut off unless
³there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of
Congress.´265 Overton Park expanded the rule, holding there is a
presumption of reviewability for agency actions even where the decision
may have been discretionary with the agency.266
In Kansas, the review of agency actions is conducted exclusively
under the Kansas Act for Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement of
261. Id.
262. Id. State long-arm statutes represent another type of statutory imposition of derivative
liability. The federal courts of Kansas generally hold that little or no showing of alter ego status or
veil-piercing factors is necessary to assert personal jurisdiction over corporate affiliates under the
state¶s longarm statute. See Grimandi v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 512 F. Supp. 764, 771 (D. Kan. 1981);
Energy Reserves Grp. v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 483, 489±90 (D. Kan. 1978). Writing in 1978,
the Federal District Court for the District of Kansas announced:
This Court today concludes that alter ego principles no longer play any proper role in the
analysis of the constitutional propriety of the exercise of jurisdiction properly invoked by
service authorized by statute. This Court further concludes that because of the broad
wording of the Kansas long-arm statute, and because of the liberal interpretation to be given
its literal reach, alter ego principles play no viable role in the construction and applicability
of that statute and consequently do not restrict those who might be reached for service
thereunder.
Superior Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. at 490. The District of Kansas distinguished the propriety of piercing
the corporate veil from the constitutional propriety of the exercise of jurisdiction. Id. at 506±07.
Whereas piercing the veil rests on a number of corporate law factors necessitating analysis of the
nature of the relationship, and degree of control or identity, between the corporate person and its
owners, exercising jurisdiction merely requires the existence of the relationship itself. Id. As a
consequence, while the mere existence of a relationship between corporate entities would not suffice
to disregard their corporate forms, it is enough to constitutionally treat the entities as one under a state
long-arm statute. See id.
263. 387 U.S. 136 (1967), superseded by statute, S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 40, as recognized in
Lubrizol Corp. v. Train, 547 F.2d 310, n.22 (6th Cir. 1976).
264. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
265. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 140 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702) (internal quotation marks omitted).
266. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410.
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Agency Actions.267 Generally, the Act entitles a person to judicial review
of any final agency action. Non-final agency action is generally not
reviewable except where ³[i]t appears likely that the person will
qualify . . . for judicial review of the related final agency action,´ and
³postponement of judicial review would result in an inadequate remedy or
irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from
postponement.´268 The Act sets forth eight grounds for review of agency
action.269 The most frequently cited ground for review of agency action is
subparagraph 8, ³the agency action is otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious.´270 In Kansas, arbitrary or capricious conduct can be shown
where an administrative order is not supported by ³evidence that is
substantial.´271 Substantial evidence is evidence that ³possesses both
relevance and substance, and which furnishes a substantial basis of fact
from which the issues can be reasonably resolved.´272 In general, this
standard has been held to mean the agency must express the basic facts on
which it relies ³with sufficient specificity to convey to the parties, as well
as to the court, an adequate statement of the facts which persuaded the
agency to arrive at its decision.´273 However, ³[f]indings of ultimate fact
expressed in the language of the applicable statute are not enough in the
absence of basic findings to support them.´274
Accordingly, the Commission must support its licensing decisions by
substantial evidence and convey the factual basis for its decisions to the
affected parties. In sum, given the corporate and constitutional limitations
on the Commission¶s power in this context, it would not satisfy the
standards of the Kansas Act for Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement of
Agency Actions to simply state in an order denying a license application
that the applicant was found to be ³associated´ with an entity that is in
regulatory noncompliance.275

267. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 77-601 to -630 (2009).
268. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-608 (1984).
269. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-621(c) (2009).
270. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-621(c)(8).
271. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-621(c)(7).
272. Kan. Racing Mgmt., Inc. v. Kan. Racing Comm¶n, 770 P.2d 423, 438±39 (Kan. 1989)
(quoting In re Petition of City of Shawnee for Annexation of Land, 687 P.2d 603, 619 (Kan. 1984)).
273. Blue Cross of Kan., Inc. v. Bell, 607 P.2d 498, 504±05 (Kan. 1980).
274. Id. at 505 (citing Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm¶n, 440 P.2d 660, 668 (Kan.
1968)).
275. See supra note 2.
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IV. PROPOSING A STANDARD FOR DISREGARDING CORPORATE
FORMALITIES IN OPERATOR LICENSING IN KANSAS
This Section proposes a procedural and a substantive standard for the
Commission to satisfy before denying a new or renewal operator license
application under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155(c)(4) based on the liability of
an applicant¶s constituent for the regulatory noncompliance of another
operator. These standards are synthesized from the competing public
policies at stake in these licensing cases, and the principles of corporate,
constitutional, and administrative law surveyed above. This Section
argues for a factor test requiring the Commission to balance the competing
policies and establish either the culpability of an individual with some
degree of management control over the applicant, or a business association
between the applicant and the operator primarily liable for the underlying
regulatory violation within which the applicant can locate the primary
liability for the violation with the operator.
A. Identifying the Competing Policies
The Commission¶s power to deny applications for new and renewal
operator licenses pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155(c)(4) is clearly not
absolute.
It is subject to constraints imposed under corporate,
constitutional, and administrative law principles. The extent of each of
these constraints is not perfectly clear in Kansas law. Under corporate law
principles, the Commission cannot invade the limited liability of the
applicant, and other corporate licensed operators with which the applicant
is associated, absent a showing that the harm of disregarding the corporate
form is outweighed by the public good of doing so.276 Under due process
considerations, the Commission cannot deprive an applicant of its
constitutionally protected right to an operator license unless justified by a
countervailing legitimate governmental interest in protecting the public
welfare.277 And under administrative principles, the Commission cannot
impose liability on a license applicant for a regulatory violation committed
by one licensed operator without showing that it may do so within the
limits of its statutory authority and basing its decision on substantial
evidence.278
Each of the three categories of constraints on the state requires the
Commission to balance the public policy benefits of respecting applicants¶
corporate separateness against the public policies protected by the
276. See supra Part III.A.
277. See supra Part III.B.
278. See supra Part III.C.
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Commission¶s authorizing statutes and regulations. There are a number of
competing public policies at stake in any case where the Commission
seeks to impose liability for a regulatory infraction of another licensee on
an applicant for a new or renewed operator license. These primarily
include:
(1) the protection of usable groundwater and surface water from
pollution by unplugged wells or drainage into unplugged wells; 279
(2) the economic benefits of limited liability, to which courts and
commentators have attributed diversification, liquidity, market
efficiency, and the very existence of publicly traded
corporations;280
(3) the protection of the public and environment from negative
externalities of oil and gas development;281 and
(4) the administrative costs of requiring the Commission to satisfy
the common law veil-piercing standard employed by Kansas
courts.282

With these competing public policies in mind, the following
subsections will turn to synthesizing a procedural and substantive standard
for the Commission to apply in balancing these policies in licensing
proceedings.
B. Whether Applicants Have a Property Interest in a License
To enjoy the protections of due process, an applicant must first
establish it has a property interest in the license. Kansas authority is fairly
clear that a legitimate claim of entitlement to a license exists if the
licensing statute ensures any applicant will receive a license upon
satisfying certain enumerated requirements.283 Like the licensing statute
in Rydd, the statute under which the Commission grants operator licenses,
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155, is ³within the category of licenses which the
State must grant if the applicant meets certain minimum requirements.´284
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155 states in pertinent part:

279. See supra Part II.B.
280. See supra Part III.A.1.
281. See Winkler v. Anderson, 177 P. 521, 522 (Kan. 1919); State v. Lebow, 280 P. 773, 775
(Kan. 1929).
282. See S.O.U.P., Inc. v. F.T.C., 449 F.2d 1142, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting).
283. See supra Part III.B.1 (citing Zimmerman v. Bd. of Cty. Comm¶rs, 264 P.3d 989, 1002 (Kan.
2011)).
284. Kan. Racing Mgmt., Inc. v. Kan. Racing Comm¶n, 770 P.2d 423, 432 (Kan. 1989) (emphasis
added).
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(b) Every operator and contractor shall file an application or a renewal
application with the [C]ommission. Application and renewal application
forms shall be prescribed, prepared and furnished by the [C]ommission.
....
(e) Upon the approval of the application or renewal application, the
[C]ommission shall issue to such applicant a license which shall be in
full force and effect until one year from the date of issuance or until
surrendered, suspended or revoked as provided in K.S.A. 55-162, and
amendments thereto.285

The plain language of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155 does not empower
the Commission to exercise any discretion whatsoever in deciding to grant
an application that satisfies the enumerated requirements. Rather, like the
licensing statute at issue in Rydd, the statute conditions receipt of an
operator license on satisfaction of the enumerated requirements. Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 55-155 thus provides a ³mutual understanding´ that
applicants who satisfy the enumerated requirements will receive a license.
Applicants for original and renewal operator licenses clearly have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to, and therefore a protectable property
interest in, a license. This conclusion is burnished by the Commission¶s
regulations. Under Kan. Admin. Regs. § 82-3-120(i), ³A denial [of an
application] pursuant to K.S.A. 55-155(c)(3) or (4), and amendments
thereto, shall be considered a license revocation,´ which would clearly
entail a present property interest.286 Determining that applicants possess a
protected property interest in a license does not, of course, end the
analysis. It remains to be determined what procedural and substantive
protections applicants enjoy in the license, as well as what limited liability
protection applicants have in their corporate form.
C. Synthesizing a Procedural Rule for Applying Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55155(c)(4)
In fashioning a procedural due process standard, courts consider the
following factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the
agency¶s action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used and the probable value of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the governmental interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.287
The amount of weight given to the first factor depends on the nature of the
285. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-155(b), (e) (2015).
286. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 82-3-120(i) (2010) (emphasis added).
287. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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protected property right at stake.288 In general, business licenses that are
granted to any applicant who satisfies the enumerated application
requirements enjoy a lower level of protection relative to licenses that are
granted to a limited number of applicants.289 Being a license granted to
any qualified applicant, the Kansas operator license²though undoubtedly
a protected property interest²likely deserves relatively low procedural
protections.
Nevertheless, the Commission¶s regulations specify that when an
application is denied on the basis of the liability imputation provision of
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155(c)(4), the denial is to be treated as a license
revocation.290 Under Kansas precedent, license revocations require at
least notice of the grounds for the revocation and a pre-revocation
hearing.291 The precise procedures, such as evidentiary standards and
burdens of proof, are less well defined. It appears a license revocation
hearing at the Commission would be governed by the Kansas
Administrative Procedure Act (³KAPA´),292 which provides specific
procedures.293
The procedural protections provided by a pre-revocation hearing held
in accordance with KAPA would satisfy the constraints of procedural due
process on the Commission¶s power to deny a license on the grounds of
imputed liability for a regulatory violation. The fact that an operator
license may be granted to any number of qualified applicants weighs
against requiring any greater procedural protections.
D. Synthesizing a Substantive Standard for Applying Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55155(c)(4)
Even if the Commission holds a pre-revocation hearing on the denial
of a license under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155(c)(4) and follows the
procedures required by KAPA, it still may not arbitrarily deprive a license
applicant of a license in violation of substantive due process. In this case,
substantive due process requires, at a minimum, that the Commission find
the existence of a connection between the applicant and the regulatory
violation and that the severity of the regulatory noncompliance is
significant enough to justify the effects on the applicant of denying the
license application. The connection between the applicant and the
responsible operator may be shown through the culpability of the
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

See supra text accompanying notes 224±226.
See supra text accompanying notes 224±226.
KAN. ADMIN. REG. § 82-3-102(i).
See Kan. Racing Mgmt., Inc. v. Kan. Racing Comm¶n, 770 P.2d 423, 434 (Kan. 1989).
Kansas Administrative Procedure Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 77-501, to -566 (2018).
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-162(a)(5) (2018).
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applicant¶s constituent or through a business association with the operator
primarily liable for the violation. The standard synthesized below ensures
this minimum protection by requiring the Commission to consider
multiple factors designed to achieve an equitable balancing of the
competing public policies set forth above in Part IV.A.
When the state seeks to enforce a statute, substantive due process
essentially requires the state establish: (1) that enforcement of the statute
has for its object the preservation of ³the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare´ and is within the scope of legislative power; and (2) that
enforcement is reasonable, based on balancing the rights of persons
subject to the statute with the government¶s interest.294 Further, the state
must be sensitive to more carefully tailored alternative means of achieving
its goal.295
When the Commission denies a license application under Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 55-155(c)(4), the nature of the interest infringed is a protected
property right in the license.296 The ³strength´ of this property interest,
however, may be diminished by the fact that licenses are granted to any
applicant that satisfies the minimum statutory requirements.297 The
degree of the infringement is nevertheless serious. Denial of an operator
license means the applicant is denied the right to pursue certain economic
activities. The Commission has acknowledged the seriousness of denial of
a license renewal under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155(c)(4) by equating it with
a license revocation.298
The state has a clear, legitimate interest in regulating the oil and gas
industry. The Kansas Supreme Court has lamented that regulation is often
necessary to preserve the public welfare from some negative externalities
of oil and gas development.299 The state has a specific public policy
protecting useable groundwater from oil pollution from gas development,
as well as a policy against abandoned and unplugged wells as a
nuisance.300 After establishing a legitimate government interest in the
enforcement of Commission statutes and regulations²especially those
294. See State v. Lebow, 280 P. 773, 775 (Kan. 1929); see generally supra Part III.C.3 (surveying
the requirements of substantive due process law in general and in the context of administrative
licensing). Substantive due process analysis requires a ³case-by-case balancing of the nature of the
individual interest infringed, the importance of the government interest furthered, the degree of
infringement and the sensitivity of the government entity responsible for the action to more carefully
tailored alternative means of achieving its goal.´ Darling v. Kan. Water Office, 774 P.2d 941, 945±46
(Kan. 1989) (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)).
295. Darling, 774 P.2d at 946.
296. See supra Part IV.B.
297. See supra Part IV.B.
298. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 82-3-120(j) (2002).
299. See Winkler v. Anderson, 177 P. 521, 522 (Kan. 1919).
300. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-156 (2018).
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pertaining to well plugging²the question turns to whether the
Commission may reasonably impute the regulatory failures of
³associated´ operators to a license applicant.
One consideration in determining the reasonableness of imputing
regulatory liability of other operators to applicants is whether the action is
carefully tailored to achieve the government interest at stake. 301 This
requires the Commission establish a connection between the applicant and
the imputed regulatory violation that would either (a) make the applicant
culpable for the violation or (b) allow the applicant a means of allocating
the ultimate liability for the violation with the operator primarily
responsible. The Commission may establish such a connection in a
number of different ways. For instance, it would establish culpability with
the applicant to show that the individual associated with the applicant
under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155(c)(4) is directly personally liable under a
Commission order for a regulatory violation.302
Alternatively, the associated individual may be found to be indirectly
liable for the regulatory violation. This could mean that the Commission
determines after a hearing that the individual as an officer, director,
manager, owner, or employee of the operator responsible for the violation
is personally liable for the violation because she exercised control over the
subject matter of the violation or otherwise acted wrongfully. It could also
mean that the Commission determines after a hearing that the individual,
as an owner of the operator responsible for the violation, is personally
liable for the violation because the operator was merely her alter ego and
she used the corporate form to perpetuate an injustice.
In lieu of showing that the applicant is culpable for the underlying
violation, the Commission may satisfy the reasonableness requirement by
establishing that the applicant is in a business association with the operator
primarily liable for the violation and that it has the ability, within the
relationship, to locate ultimate liability on the appropriate operator, as in
Portland Pipe Line.303
A second consideration in determining the reasonableness of the
Commission¶s application of the statute is whether there is alternative
means of achieving the same government interest that entails a lesser
degree of infringement on individual rights.304 Kansas law provides a
number of alternative means of enforcing well-plugging liability and
301. See Darling v. Kan. Water Office, 774 P.2d 941, 946 (Kan. 1989).
302. See Kan. Comm¶n on Civil Rights v. Serv. Envelope Co., 660 P.2d 549, 555 (Kan. 1983)
(requiring a corporate constituent to be individually named in a Commission order to justify enforcing
the order against the constituent).
303. See Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Envt¶l Improv. Comm¶n, 307 A.2d 1, 18 (Me. 1973).
304. See Darling, 774 P.2d at 946.
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ensuring plugging of wells. One such alternative for ensuring plugging of
a well would be the plugging fee funds.305 This alternative may be
particularly appropriate, instead of imposing derivative liability on an
applicant for another operator¶s violations, where the operator primarily
responsible for the well is defunct, dissolved, or bankrupt. In such a case,
it is not possible for the applicant to ultimately place liability for the well
on the person primarily responsible.
Finally, as articulated by Professor Silva, reasonableness requires
application of substantive due process principles similar to those set forth
in Gore.306 Initially, these principles require that the Commission
consider whether the applicant had fair notice that the past regulatory
violations of its constituents (and those other persons identified in Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 55-155(c)(4)) may be imputed to the applicant, and that the
violations of corporate operators with which those constituents were
associated may be imputed to the constituents individually. In all
likelihood, neither the applicant nor any of its constituents would have
such notice unless the constituent was culpable for the violation (either by
her own wrongdoing or as a person who exercised control over the subject
matter of the violation).
The Gore principles applied in this context would also require the
Commission to consider (1) the severity of the underlying regulatory
violation and (2) the proportionality of the severity of the violation to the
harm a denial of the license would cause the applicant.307 If, as the
Supreme Court held, these considerations, or ³guideposts,´ are appropriate
in determining the reasonableness of a punitive damages award, they must
also be appropriate in determining whether an applicant for an operator
license should be punished for the regulatory noncompliance of another
operator.308
From these various principles, we can distill the following eight
factors to guide the Commission in imputing the regulatory failures of
³associated´ operators to license applicants.
To impute the
noncompliance of another operator to the applicant under Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 55-155(c)(4), the Commission should consider:
(1) the existence of a Commission order naming the individual
associated with the applicant as primarily liable for the underlying
regulatory violation;
(2) whether the individual committed any wrongdoing relating to
the regulatory violation or otherwise exercised such control over
305.
306.
307.
308.

See supra text accompanying notes 23±24.
See supra Part III.B.3.a.
See generally supra Part III.B.3.a.
BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1995).
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the subject matter of the violation as to be considered personally
liable as an operator;
(3) whether the individual may be personally liable for the violation
under the common law doctrine of alter ego or veil piercing;
(4) the extent of the individual¶s managerial control of the
applicant;
(5) the existence of a business association between the applicant
and the operator primarily responsible for the regulatory violation
and the ability of the applicant to locate primary liability for the
violation with that operator;
(6) whether the applicant or the individual associated with the
applicant had fair notice that the regulatory violation may cause the
Commission to deny a subsequent license application;
(7) the severity of the regulatory violation; and
(8) the proportionality of the severity of the violation to the harm a
denial of the license would cause the applicant.

It is not necessary the Commission establish each factor to deny a
license application under subsection (c)(4). Certain factors deserve greater
weight than others. In particular, factors (1)±(3), when present, should
weigh strongly in favor of imputing the regulatory violation to the
licensee. This analysis requires the Commission to show more than the
mere association of a corporate applicant with one of individuals identified
in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155(c)(4) and the individual¶s association with a
noncompliant operator. It requires showing either culpability of the
associated individual for the underlying regulatory violation²through her
own wrongdoing or her control of the subject matter of the violation or the
noncompliant operator²or a business association between the applicant
and the noncompliant operator that would enable the applicant to place
ultimate liability for the violation where it justly belongs.
Where no such culpability or business association exists, the
Commission¶s police powers to regulate the oil and gas industry do not
justify piercing the corporate veil of the applicant and also of the operator
originally responsible for the violation.309 Further, where the Commission
cannot establish a business association in which the applicant may locate
primary liability for a well-plugging violation, we believe the Commission
already has adequate alternative means of enforcing the government¶s
interest in plugging the well in the form of the plugging fee fund.
Consider the following hypothetical scenario. ABC, Inc. applied for
an operator license and was denied under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55-155(c)(4)

309. It should be noted that the piercing in this scenario is actually a reverse piercing because it
attributes the regulatory noncompliance of a corporate constituent to the corporate applicant.
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on the basis that its treasurer was formerly a director of XYZ, LLC, which
has an abandoned well on its operator license. XYZ was liquidated in
Chapter Seven bankruptcy proceedings five years ago and its liability for
plugging any wells was discharged.310 The evidence showed that ABC¶s
treasurer, while a director of XYZ, had no direct personal responsibility
for the unplugged well. Under these facts, there is no evidence to support
the individual culpability of ABC¶s treasurer. Nor is there evidence of a
business association between ABC and XYZ by which ABC could locate
primary liability for the well to XYZ because XYZ was liquidated. In this
case, the unplugged well is truly orphaned and a good candidate for
plugging under the state¶s plugging fee fund. It would be unnecessary and
unreasonable to make ABC liable for the well.
The test also requires the Commission to weigh the severity of the
underlying regulatory violation against the significance of denying an
operator license to an applicant who otherwise satisfies the statutory
requirements. Consider, for instance, a case where the underlying
regulatory violation relates to responsibility for a shallow abandoned,
unplugged oil well in eastern Kansas. If the evidence at the pre-revocation
hearing showed that there is little to no useable groundwater in the vicinity
of the well, such that the well does not seriously threaten groundwater
pollution, the Commission should find that factors (7) and (8) weigh
against denying the license. Consider also a case involving a large
corporation that operates hundreds of wells across the state. In general,
larger entities have more officers, directors, and owners, and thus have a
greater risk of suffering imputed regulatory liability under subsection
(c)(4). Denial of a large operator¶s license renewal may have far-reaching
effects in terms of the number of leases, amounts of money, and number
of employees and contractors potentially involved. Are the consequences
of denying such an operator¶s license renewal on the basis of imputed
liability justified by the severity of the underlying regulatory violation? It
would seem not, at least where the violation is one or a few unplugged
wells. Of course, the relative burden of plugging a few wells may be
small for large corporations. Thus, when analyzing factors (7) and (8), the
Commission should bear these considerations in mind. It should also
consider the potential impact such imputation may have on other large
operators¶ perceptions of the state¶s regulatory and business climate.

310. See NCL Corp. v. Lone Star Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 144 B.R. 170, 177 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (noting
response costs related to prepetition releases are generally discharged in bankruptcy); see, e.g., In re
Sandridge Energy, Inc., No. 16-32488 (DRJ), 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 4622, at *105±07, *260±62 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2016) (approving plan of reorganization in which prepetition plugging liability is
discharged).
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It could be argued that imposing a multifactorial standard on the
denial of new and renewal license applications under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 55155(c)(4) would add administrative burdens to the Commission.
Undoubtedly it would require greater administrative costs to require the
Commission to hold a pre-revocation evidentiary hearing to determine
whether the state can satisfy any standard. But these costs are more than
justified by the important public policies at stake in the applicant¶s rights
in the license and the limited liability of its corporate form. Based on its
decision in Agricultural Energy Services, the Commission appears willing
to undertake greater administrative burdens to avoid arbitrarily denying an
operator license on the basis of another operator¶s regulatory
noncompliance.311 On balance, the benefits to public policy of imposing a
test such as is proposed above is justified by the administrative burden it
entails.
V. CONCLUSION
The state of Kansas has an undeniable interest in the protection of
fresh, usable groundwater and surface water from pollution by unplugged
wells. It has a further interest in the licensing and regulation of oil and gas
operators. But, as the Commission itself found in Agricultural Energy
Services, its previous unprincipled application of the licensing statute to
impose well-plugging liability on operators with no culpability for the well
nor meaningful association with the responsible operator is not a
reasonable exercise of its power. The principles of limited liability and
due process are too important to allow the Commission to disregard the
legal separateness of oil and gas operators without examination of the
facts or policies at stake in any given case. The Commission should not
altogether cease to impute well-plugging liability to operator applicants
following Agricultural Energy Services. Instead, it should do so under a
standard like the one proposed in this article that places liability for
unplugged wells and other regulatory violations on a culpable person and
balances the competing policies underpinning corporate, constitutional,
and administrative law in Kansas.

311. Agriculture Energy Servs., Docket No.: 17-CONS-3529-CMSC, 2018 Kan. PUC LEXIS 125,
*11 (Kan. Corp. Comm¶n Jan. 23, 2018).

